

## Startup

Philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence. Now the question is: how has this activity been performed in the history? Most of the thinkers perform this activity on the basis of their allegiance to a theory imprinted beforehand. For them, the best mode to philosophize is to put the structure in the center and then to reflect on to justify the frame by raising different queries from the opponents side, showing inconsistency and contradiction in others theories and proving them logically defective, epistemologically unsupported and impractical that does not deserve respect.

When one communicates we understand the meaning flashed on the basis of which communications are accomplished. A philosopher, having an allegiance to a different meaning due to his commitment to his cultural/physiological/religious entities, conceptualizes the concept in view of his allegiance differently. He refutes other theories on the same concept by raising different queries and showing inconsistencies in them with a purpose of establishing his own theory as rationally standard and comprehensive that meets out the queries and contradictions regarding the conceptualization of the concept. He thinks, his activities are philosophical as it settles his enterprise on rational ground and claims the truth of the objects, as he conceives. The history of philosophy is full of such attempts in the name of philosophical reflection. Are all such attempts termed as philosophical activity? Philosophy is not confined to framing and forming a system or to favoring any of our allegiances with strong reason and skill; however, it may attract the followers and may take place of a venerable religion but keeps our reflections away from doing pure philosophy or philosophy proper.

Metaphysicians support their theories by epistemic proofs and reasoning. On close observation we find that they talk about a divided epistemology. Some claim to confine the experiences to what they can acquire by senses and infer by mind on the basis of the sensory perception. Among them, some believes that our experiences as such cannot be conveyed by language and for that reason they prescribe spiritual practices (sadhana), which sublimate one's personality on the basis of which he can communicate even without speaking. Some others believe in super sensual experiences that is intuition or direct experiences that a realizer of truth can only know. They accommodate the realist's epistemology to show that they are comprehensive in their spirit but before sifting to intuition, they point out the limit, contradictions and unsteadiness of the sensuous experiences in knowing the truth that for them can be known only by realization, a supra-sensuous mode of knowing or immediacy that works without any epistemic sources and, hence, trans-epistemological.

Based on preconceived metaphysical and epistemological frame, they theorize aesthetic reality according to which beauty is ideal that can be approached only approximately and not accurately that can be known only by being that. All our approaches are approximations of the reality that is beyond the grasp of our mind and language and for knowing which we have to

keep all our reasoning and language -exercises aside. These theories in East and West gave birth and importance to mysticism in which skepticism and subjectivism lastly culminate.

These one-sided philosophical moves were challenged by post –modernists especially by Jacques Derrida who adopted the method of deconstructing and uprooting the metaphysical, epistemological and aesthetic entities of the theories in question. More than two thousand earlier to Derrida a more radical mode to unnerve these theories was moved by Nagarjuna that in Asian continent continued in the works of Jayrasi Bhatta, Sriharsa and some others. But that could not check the attraction of the minds of those who love mystification in the name of philosophization. Their peeling of the problems has a deep root to unknot the problems, keep them open fit for approaching afresh but lastly to frame a structure of a theory -loaded thoughts and to deconstruct that structure are the processes of the same post.

Philosophy herein works out the possibility of reflections without intermingling with any kind of metaphysical, physiological, theological, religious entities and our allegiances to them. Philosophical reflections are confined to the problems as they figure in and what is figured in is defined as the intelligible beings of language and meaning it expresses. Proper estimation of language results in autonomy of language that perceives infusion of language and thought in philosophical reflections. It considers language as expresser by nature that expresses meaning by itself independently of ontic and psychological entities/theories, our allegiances and commitment to them. Language is ubiquitous principle; it is not confined to material garbs (spoken or written marks that we perceive by senses) but is awareness as well. Intelligible beings are cognized only in present even the past and future events also flash in present and are known so as the language presents them thus. The purpose of use of language is to cause incentive for action. Language reveals cognition independently of any ontic/religious/cultural entities and our allegiance to them and, hence, disinterested but is interested when we impose our allegiances to ontic/psychological/religious entities and theory- impregnations on cognition. Philosophical analysis is concerned with analyzing and interpreting cognition as it flashes by language and that flashes serve as foundational ground for exercising logical/artificial skill. The purpose of analysis is not confined to removing our different allegiances/ doubts and inconsistency in the use but to make the indivisible cognition understandable to those who can understand it only through analytic scheme and finally to get clarity and wisdom as well.

The problem of one language and many languages is often asked. Inside a language there are differences of speeches and scripts also. It is truism to accept many garbs-Sanskrit, English, German, Chinese, etc. It can be said that the speeches/scripts spoken and written respectively in different communities can change, die and lost in the trace of history. It can also be said that corrupt uses and death of traditional scripts are essential aspect of creativity because it helps in enriching and constructing a new set of garbs. One cannot think of a universal language abstracted from different languages because all of them have their own identity different from others. There are some common elements or similarity in all languages but that cannot be the basis of constructing a

universal language acceptable to all who converse in differently speeches and scripting. One have a private venture of constructing a language but that is not a language in which even he cannot understand and communicate with members of his community. Even in history no great mind has tried to frame a Universal language.

It is also true to say that when a philosopher philosophizes language he thinks that though the medium of his philosophization is a particular language, his reflections are universally meaningful even for the time to come. One can know, reflect, analyze, and interpret language only by language. This shifts the discussion on universality of thought different from thinking a universal language. I cannot understand the thoughts given in Chinese language because I have not learnt that language. However, I can understand those thoughts if it is translated in the languages that I know and communicate. I can evaluate those thoughts on the basis of translations as sound or sick and thus can easily understand that thoughts are ubiquitous; it is not confined to you or to me and to Chinese, English, etc.

This ubiquity principle serve as the basis of universality of thoughts; the thoughts are universal; it is the basis of communication between the speaker and audience; it can be basis of abstraction through garbs, can be manifested by garbs, can be imposed on individuals, can be the cause of identical cognition in different occurrences and instances of garbs and likewise. Is thought different from language and reality? Some claims that all the three are different but related logically or artificially. Reality if it is a fact is represented by language then where does thought stand? According to representationists the reality is external to thought and language and is captured by senses and what the senses capture is data or facts, which are, constructed thoughts for the expression of which we employ language. Is thought the fact represented by language? If the represented and representation both are facts and are discrete facts it does not sound clear as to where does thought stand, that is: is it a representation or represented or something different from the two? Being an experience, it is also a fact and then it cannot be relation because relation is always to be found in between the two and is always dependent. Contemporary language philosophers intrude a separate concept 'proposition'. The problem is: they sometimes use the term 'proposition' for sentence that can be either true or false (AEIO propositions in logic), some other times they use it as something abstracted from sentences and some other time in the sense of meaning and still other times the concept is used by them neither as language nor as meaning, neither as representation nor as the thing represented. The being is neither the thing -in-itself nor an abstraction; the Being is neither the content of abstraction and nor abstracted but revealed object of which we are self conscious in a philosophical activity.

However, all propositionists accept it as abstracted thought. The question then is: is this abstraction has the identity of language or of meaning or of something different from meaning? No amicably agreeable view of the question is found in contemporary western philosophy. Moreover, they are different when they define these concepts separately and are quite different when they theorize out of relating them. This causes confusion in understanding the proper denotation of these concepts. It is useless to induce a third entity apart from language and meaning. I may be mistaken in my observation of the term because it is purely a western concept having no Indian parallel.

Suffice it to confine to language and meaning for the interpretation of cognition. In a cognitive activity that we are condemned to perform by verbal noises and scripts we find never alienated from intelligible beings of language and meaning; as flashes these are not construction of mind but revealed beings; they are infused and garbed in the unity of awareness. This is the reason I do not maintain a difference of of the two in ant cognitive activity I perform through language. But very quickly I add that the intelligible being of language is not trapped in only a particular garb used in a community; it is such that can flash in through any garb of any language speaking community. You are the constant content and can change your look by putting on different clothes of different colors, size and shape at any moment similarly we find a difference between language as garb and it as flash. The former is material product while the latter is flash of awareness nature or revealed being. The former causes incentive to produce the latter. The language as garb and the language as thought are related as manifesters manifested; the former manifests the latter but this manifestation is also not suffice for cognition. Manifested by garbs the language as concept reveals its nature in the garb of our use from which it's meaning is revealed non-differently and independently from anything outside it that is, the external or internal things or our allegiances to them. The two-language and meaning are related by the natural fitness of the former. These are concepts and universal in character. Universals are not abstracted; they are intelligible objects that only flash.

Apart from ubiquity principle we rely on two other reasons for accepting these concepts universal. First- universal is that which is manifested by the individual or individuals falling in the class of the particular universal and second- identical cognition by the use of language in its different occurrences and instances is accomplished of which universal is the cause. A flash is always new; it in its character is awareness and it functions as incentive to individual doings.

Metaphysicians very often make a difference between experience, which for them is direct, and its expression in language. The former is void of language and the latter is construction of the former in language. The former is not sharable and communicable but the latter only is both sharable and communicable. The former may be the object of spiritual practice but the latter is the object of discourse and analysis.

The world of thoughts is the world of universals and in knowing the world outside constituted by individuals, the universals serve as the cognitive basis. Universal expressed are imposed on the individuals because of whom they are also known by implication, inference, and other epistemological and logical devices.

Very often scholars miss the subtle distinction between cognition and knowledge and that causes confusion in understanding the knowledge of the objects. In cognition we know objects –universals that flash in a cognition, which is awareness of the beings or concepts that flash but knowledge is the self-awareness of the flashes that is the cognition of the concepts or intelligible beings. Concepts are given but we make a difference between the given and the flashing of the given. Out of the two states we directly know only the latter. Element of distinctive cognition or otherness is the character of beings and their memory that flash in cognition. Out of 'I know the pot' and that 'I know that I know the pot' the former is an instance of cognition and the latter of knowledge. Let me clear the point with the example of perception and perceptual knowledge. While going through the road my eyes are open. I perceive so many thing and cognize only some things. If somebody asks have

you seen my cow on the road through which you come? I cannot say that 'I did not see'. Rather I say I could not mind. This means that the cow in my way does not figure in my cognition. Had it figured it would have become the part of my knowledge? The objects of cognition figure in memory and cognized always in present but there is no division of time in knowledge. Cognition is accomplished always in present even the objects/events belonging to past, future and present figure in present. The object retained in memory flashes in mind because of self-awareness of the cognition accomplished earlier.

What does figure in cognition that we determinately accomplish? In my analysis in *Language, Being & Cognition* (2014), it is only intelligible beings that are language and meaning that figure in cognition. Meaning is revealed and infused by language. The term 'flash or flashing of the concept' is best appropriate term for that we know. It comprises of language and meaning infused by the former. The concept may be taken as given indivisible or constructed by abstraction but in either case it is cognized when flashes through mediums (utterances/scripts/gestures/data, etc.) and through them it is analyzed into parts that is- sentences, subordinate sentences, phrases, words, suffices, prefixes, particles letters, half of a letter and likewise and their meanings are decided in the analytic scheme.

Where there is consciousness developed to the extent of being self-conscious, there is concept. We know the concepts when they flash and they flash through instrumentation or garbs. Concepts are taken up by the theorists differently as per the allegiance of the theory they intend to frame and we understand that conceptualization of the concept as their conception of the concept. Going through those different conceptualizations, we confront with some problems, confusions, inconsistencies, inappropriateness, etc. If any, that invites philosophical reflection on one hand and reflecting on to remove them leads us to wisdom on the other. The flashing of the concepts causes incentive in the matter of to do, not to do or to do otherwise; causes incentive for speaking as per expectancy to communicate and serves as the cause of production of verbal noises/ gestures, etc. Scripts that are garbs stand by proxy for the verbal noises.

The difference between the logicians and metaphysicians on language philosophy is that the latter accepts thing-itself that is represented by language and the former construct a system in which the world outside is constructed into logical facts. These facts stand as intermediary between the world and proposition; a system in which the language represents a logical fact of a logical world. But in both of the cases language is separate from the thought and reality. Both of them have their own logic- logic of transcendence for the former and the logic of logical facts-verification, falsification, etc., for the latter. Keeping meaning in the center, both of them talk about a non-natural / artificial use of language without caring a deviation from the natural language which expresses meaning.

A difference between meaning-oriented and language-oriented philosophies of language can well be observed. Fixing a goal of standard use for a determinate meaning language in the history is approached popularly in two ways- first, in a preconceived model of meaning and second in a preconceived model of language with which linguistic scholars occupy. Both sorts of the attempts work with a model that relegate most of the creative uses of language and even so by concentrating only to some chosen sentence-instances that fit in their model of determining meaning. For example, A.J. Ayer and the empiricists adopt a preconceived model of meaning for which a statement

in order to be a statement must refer to a referent in the empirical world. This static model does little care for our daily uses and dynamism of language. Metaphysician's model is trapped so highly with meaning that they observe language only as a pointer to something-in-itself. The view of language as representation and reference overlooks other functions of language. J. L. Austin tried to provide with functional analysis of language that is what function or functions language perform in a use. The problem with all these theories of language is that they estimate language from the view of meaning that is never found separate from language. Meaning isolated from language is non-existence (apada) but they ascribe it as an outcome of the use of language and overlook the very nature of language as it figures or is expressed. Viewing language from the consequences of the function of the uses, the function and nature of function the language performs are different. Any attempt of philosophizing based on meaning-oriented view fails to note the great variety and ways and above all the conceptual nature of language; it overlooks even the difference between the concept and the flashing of the concept and thus drive away philosophy from its proper object or the nature of meaning we reflect on in a reflective activity that is cognitive activity par excellence.

Wittgenstein is popular because of inspiring to the attention of actual use of language but early Wittgenstein trapped only in statements of logic and science. Later he demonstrated with illustrations and samples of how we use language in daily life and emphasized the meaning of the word in its uses in language. He also realized that statements, which are not logical or scientific, couldn't be ruled out of the court as meaningless. With his game theory in Investigations he observes that there is no common element in language. There is family resemblance like games. By this method he opined that words have family of meaning and hence 'do not ask for meaning, ask for the use' welcomed as a very effective theory of meaning on the basis of which we can understand different meanings of a word as we find in dictionaries. This was really a great move but for giving importance to use for meaning he underestimate the power of language and preferred to induce some ultra virus elements like context, intention with a hope that these factors are fit if meaning is use. These factors are neither language that is used nor meaning that is conveyed by language.

This disease, according to Wittgenstein's observation, lies in the way of one's thinking and therefore it is not removed despite of giving facts, justification, evidences and proofs. The disease lies in the very method or way of deliberation. We are captive of thinking thoughts as the picture of language and language as representation of the things outside in the external world. We sometimes think that all words are words and sentences are sentence and thus similar and alike in functioning for meaning. We imagine a picture of our mind, knowledge, faith, emotions, etc., when these words are articulated. Our allegiance with those pictures is so strong that we avoid giving any other picture to these words. Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, I.114), rightly observes that 'that is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. A picture held us captive and we could not get outside it for it lies in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably'. The great sayings and great books like Gita, Quran, Avestha, Bible, etc. artificially create obstacles in our way of approaching the real. They condition the human self in such a way that he real is overlooked and the conditioned self is wrongly assumed as the real spirit. All religions and great thinkers who are realizers of spirit create this confusion when they import their realization in language to the followers. This may help in forming organized organizations of the followers but by

following those sayings they get themselves away from their spirit and they involve in strengthening the organization for a relief to their self in the conditioned life. Such attempts not only keep man away from his spirit but also keep an inner distance from one to one another, from the nature and from the spirit. The man identifies with the ideas/thoughts/ allegiances and that identification operates as the cause of suffering. Even in yogic concentration the man concentrates on a particular point and while concentrating on that point he puts himself away from all the other and from the open nature of the spirit. The present is amalgamated with the past events and the future. Freedom which we enjoy is channelized freedom; freedom of expression, religious, political, economical, moral and all sorts of freedom are not real the real freedom can be realized in the transcendence of these channelized freedoms. Wittgenstein accepted words and sentences as dead that becomes alive in actual language game rooted in the forms of life. Wittgenstein is not specific on the issue whether spirit is acceptable as the form of life or is the fabrication out of our experiences. Freeing the thoughts/meaning from captive of pictures is a great move of him but his game-device for freeing thoughts from the defect raises many questions about the proper estimation of the power of language. Is playing with the language a playing with the thought at the same time?

Philosophers doing with logical skill accept language as representation and the thought represented or represented fact. They play with idea that the world can be understood by human limitation only as representation and the represented thing. For that reason they have to maintain the difference between thought and language- one which is understood when the other is applied and make a division of thought and language on the basis of function they perform. They take language as tool to understand and determine meaning, which they place in center. They accept the necessary truth of the analytic only and with contrast to it, the truth of synthetic is put into question.

Meaning figures by language and is always determinate and makes the game of determination through logical skill possible and interesting. They overlook the cognition, which serves as ground of all logical games about meaning. Philosophization on natural language demands concentration on cognition which is revealed non-differently by language and which serves as the basis of different types of conceptual, logical, functional analysis and interpretation. The Quinean solution to the dogma of analytic and synthetic is an indication of shifting towards synthetic or the cognitive role of natural language that can only act on as the cognitive ground of solving the dogma. If otherwise, either one has to accept the distinction of them or one has to reject the analytic for giving value to the synthetic. Quine favours for the later is an attempt of coming home to the natural or to the ordinary language for providing logical skill a cognitive base. Quinean favor of sentence against the proposition, his argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction and refutation of analytic truth-conceptual (bachelors are unmarried), logical (copper is copper) and Mathematical (( $5+7= 12$ ) shows that he realizes the limitation of logical/artificial skill and argues for synthetic. Truth of synthetic sentence is not only by virtue of what it means but by the way the world is also (see, Gillian Russell, Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic distinction published in 'A companion to W.V.O. edited by Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore published from Willey Blackwell from pages 181-202,2014).

Meaning flashes by language; it is not known prior to an expression, and similar is the case with analysis and translation and all other cognitive activities. Meaning oriented activities approach the problem that in fact comes after the language reveals it or that which cannot exist in isolation from language. Meaning is of awareness in nature. Independently of language, how can it be analyzed and be a starting point of investigation and determination? If meaning isolated from language is accepted, the analysis of language will in no way be the analysis of meaning but not the vice versa. Language is only given for our all-cognitive activities. Meaning is not only expressed but is eternally infused by language also and that is the reason we take analysis of meaning by the analysis of language. To analyze language and to conceive that I analyze meaning is possible only when language that we analyze is taken to infuse meaning otherwise it will be a misguided attempt causing unsolvable confusion.

Language oriented theory of meaning favored in the discussion throughout this work not only provides all powers to language but views it as a autonomous principle in the matter of cognition. Language is not confined to speaking/writing only; it is not confined only to garbs. Garbs are instrumental in manifesting the concept language that comprises of the language as it flashes (sampratya) and the meaning non-differently expressed by it. Both the expresser and expressed are revealed and hence intelligible beings to which our cognition, philosophical reflections and investigations are confined to. These intelligible beings are only objects we know and which serve as cause of incentive to speak in speakers, expression of objects in audience, and cause of expressing identical cognition in different occurrences and instances of the uses. These cognitive beings serve as the object imposed on individuals falling under a class. For example, the intelligible being of language is imposed on garbs because of which they stand for language and the meaning expressed by the concept language is imposed on individuals in the world of experience and trans-experience. The discrete external and internal individuals are known only if the cognitive being is imposed on them and this imposition on the basis of some similarity and resemblance, implication or inference or even by opposition of the being expressed is not possible. The intelligible beings serve as the cognitive ground for imposition, etc., on external Beings because of which we know them by indication. They are presumed as the ontic substratum of the intelligible beings.

All meaning are meaning of words. Isolated from language no meaning is possible. Language is naturally fit to express meaning. Convention is not relation because relation is eternal fitness of the language because of which language is called so. It is naturally fit to express its all meaning (śabda is śakti). Convention is also power but the two powers, that is, relation and convention have different functions. The former is the power that expresses meanings and the later delimits the former that is relation to a popular meaning. Convention is also not a mess; it is a skill learnt at different phases of one's life. For example a child below five learns the uses of language by his elders and the elder's uses 'donkey' to a child for donkey the animal standing before him. After five if he is found lazy in a case, elders address him 'donkey' and then he knows that because of some similarity in laziness, carrying of heavy loads, eating much, foolishness and likewise the word is used for other meanings also. But this is all possible because the meaning of the word 'donkey' is universal that inheres in all other meanings for which the word donkey is used. All meanings of a word are categorized in to three categories- i. primary or literal meaning that is the meaning for which a word is popularly used in communication ii. Intended meaning known by imposition of



primary meaning due to some similarity and iii non-intended meaning implied by the primary meaning or known by proximity with the primary meaning. For example 'cowness' is the primary meaning of the word cow and its intended meaning will be all those forms, qualities and functions or any of them that resemble, for example cowherd, an innocent, a lazy, a voraciousness, foolishness on which primary meaning is imposed. The number and gender of the cow is known by the proximity with the primary meaning of cow. There may be number of intended and non-intended meaning of a word and all are expressed by language. Different sorts of meaning expressed by the same word are known only when the primary meaning is known first. We find that this theory provides sufficient ground for reasoning for conceptualizing a concept differently in different theories and for different meanings in different uses of a word. It does not only open reason for accepting individuals as meaning but gives a rational ground for identical cognition as well.

The criteria we accept for interpreting different sorts of meanings of word is equally applicable for interpreting different meanings by a same sentence. For example, the primary meaning of the sentence 'Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ' is the 'residence in the current of water'. Its intended use may mean 'residence on the bank of river' and the non-intended meaning 'the cool and sacred residence' is known by proximity with the primary.

Different systems of East and west philosophies on language adopt different methods and rules of interpretation of the sentences. However, as we have find in the chapter on interpretation that they with all their efforts do not succeed in claiming that their interpretation is accurately correct and is not deviated from the text. The philosophy discussed here in earlier pages is based on analysis of cognition as it flashes and serves as incentive to actions. The praise sentences are sentences in the praise of action. Action is the primary meaning for which language is used in communication and for any type of conversation as well. Unless the action is flashed the sentential meaning that is a complete sense retiring the expectancy of completion of meaning is not accomplished despite of using so many sentential garbs. The object flashed may appear as of finished character that is as substantive but action attached with that concept is essential in formation and understand the meaning of sentences. This makes the flash of concepts dynamic. This is the dynamism or creativeness of language and is denoted in a sentence by the verb, which is considered central word of a sentence in our cognitive analysis. In brief, the verb is central in sentence and action in sentential meaning. The objects flashed may be of finished or of non-finished character but they cause incentive to some or the other action. If action expressed by the text/sentence is understood in its all clarity, we can interpret the text with a criterion in the mind that the action enjoined by the text is intact and is not deviated despite of its variations in interpreting skill. It may help in framing the rules of interpretation of all sorts of texts religious, aesthetic, moral, law, and others.

Language in Sanskrit is śabda because it is not only the garbs but the flash or awareness also; the two are inseparable fromit because the latter is determinately known only through the formers. Consciousness flashes through the garbs only because of the cultural Millie of the intellect of the person or persons cultivated in a language speaking community. It is manifested through garbs and known inseparable blended with the garb of our convention. Determination cognition and its communication are possible only by language, which is not confined to garbs only because communication is the accomplishment of cognition through it only. Cognition comprises the

cognition of language first and then flashing of its meaning non-differently. Both the language and meaning are of awareness in nature. Thus analysis of garbs in a cognitive activity is a device of the analysis of thought or of the intelligible objects that figure in that cognition. Language is the expresser and meaning is the expressed of it. We do not deny the consciousness or spirit as the ontic substratum that may serve as a Reality for the realization of a spiritual aspirant but emphasize that our cognition is confined to the intelligible beings that is to language and meaning. All sorts of cognitive activities are performed by language because we accept language as ubiquitous principle, the force of awareness in nature that autonomously acts on revealing it's own nature and its meaning and conclude that our cognition, philosophical reflections, investigations and all cognitive activities are not only based on but is confined to the intelligible beings the language expresses and we analyze the cognition and objects that flash in it through the garbs-oral or written conventionally fixed for uses.