

New Title by Devendra Nath Tiwari

LANGUAGE, BEING & COGNITION: A contemporary perspective  
Author, Devendra Nath Tiwari, Professor of Philosophy & Religion, BHU, Published by Astha Publications, An Imprint of the Angelica Imprint, Guwahati, India, ISBN 978-1-63415-940-1, Pages 32+478, price-Rs.1295, July 2014.

### **About the book**

Based on the infusion thesis of language and cognition, the book takes on an analysis of cognition as it flashes when presented by language. Taking philosophy as cognitive activity par excellence, it investigates into the intelligible beings as the object-proper of philosophy and provides with a holistic philosophy based on autonomy of language. It serves as hors d'oeuvre of a new trend of analyzing and philosophizing language. Scholarly works written on the history of Indian philosophy chiefly undertake the study of metaphysics, epistemology and axiology of the different systems and ignore their reflections on language, being and verbal-cognition. The present work observes that the basic logic of the heterodox and orthodox systems cannot be analyzed and estimated properly if their philosophies about language, being and cognition are not properly analyzed and discussed. The constructionists'/ wordists' and the holists' controversy on the issues of language, being and cognition is well pointed out, appropriately analyzed and discussed conclusively in a contemporary perspective to root the autonomy of language to a philosophical reflection workable as future of philosophy.

'The Central Problems of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy' by the same author published, 2008, from Indian Council of Philosophical Research' New Delhi is very popular among the scholars of philosophy and linguistics. The present book is an outcome of author's constant learning, teaching and reflecting on the problems of philosophy of language for more than twenty five years. It analyzes language by taking it not only as a linguistic property but also as concept, a cognitive unit that infuses thought. It undertakes the analysis and interpretation of cognition as it flashes by language without any intermingling with any metaphysical, psychological and religious allegiances. Discussion in the entire book is based on the basic logic of autonomy of language for which language is expresser and the world of our knowledge i.e., language, being and cognition, is not only based on but is confined to the intelligible beings the language expresses.

Some of the problems like Autonomy thesis of language, ontic non-being VS. Intelligible being of negation, Language and Possibility of disinterested knowledge, Language and logic of translation and Analysis, Language and Grammar, Language and communication, Language and Culture, Meaning of Moral Expression, much less explored from contemporary perspective are discussed conclusively in this book that merit the book pioneer in proper understanding of these concepts in a comparison with the views of Western language philosophers. The novelty of rest

of the chapters lies in analyzing the concepts as they flash, interpreting them in comparison with Indian and Western counter parts and concluding them in a way that makes the presentation useful for students, scholars and teachers in their proper understanding of the contents and giving incentive for further researches in the field.

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# **LANGUAGE, BEING AND COGNITION**

**(Philosophy of Language and Analysis: A Contemporary Perspective)**

Foreword +Introduction +Acknowledgement

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## **Comments of Scholars on the Book**

I am quite impressed by outstanding erudition, brilliant analysis and exposition of the issues and I must congratulate Professor Devendra Nath Tiwari for his valuable contribution to the philosophy of language and analysis made by way of writing out the book 'Language, Being and Cognition'. The book, as I find, is fit to serve as a beginner/ initiator of a new trend of philosophizing based on analysis of cognition as it flashes by language. The exposition of the problems, faced by students and teachers of the universities where the courses are running, in the light of new advancement of knowledge in the field of Indian and Western philosophy of language and analysis, is simple, critical and comparative. I am sure the book will be welcomed by the academic world.

**Raghunath Ghosh,**                      *University of North Bengal*

The book has developed a unique style in presenting the views on language. I fully agree with the author that language is basically an expresser and that it is independently of the world. I enjoyed the way the author has presented this view. Author's comment on contemporary western philosophers of language especially Wittgenstein and Derrida are well taken. Wittgenstein supports the grammarian point of view and agrees that even reference has to be within language. Derrida's Transcendental signified has been rightly criticized in the book. Overall it is an excellent piece of writing for the benefit of Indian philosophy of language from contemporary perspective. I am happy to see your new book. It is a marvelous piece of work on Language, Being and Cognition. It has covered all areas of philosophy of language and cognition especially Indian philosophy of language is interpreted in a new way.

**R.C.Pradhan,**                      Central University of Hyderabad.

Language, Being and Cognition is amazing; it is stimulating to the degree that I enjoy reading my favorite philosophers such as Kierkegaard. Autonomy of language based on infusion of thought, analysis of concepts as they flash or figure in by language are remarkable contribution of the book in the field of philosophy proper. It is of high interest of academia to find a philosophy herein this book for which philosophical reflections are not only based on but are confined to the intelligible beings of language and meaning. The book works out nicely with the power of language; the discussion in all the six sections comprises of not only the problems of understanding communication but also of attaining wisdom and spirituality through the knowledge by language. I am impressed with the depth and ambition of professor Tiwari's work.