

VOLUME I

**DYNAMICS OF THE LANGUAGE-**

**(Philosophy of the world of the words)**

DEVENDRA NATH TIWARI

## Scheme of Transliteration

### Vowels

#### Devanāgarī      Transcription

अ a, A	आ ā, Ā	इ I, I	ई ī, Ī
उ u, U	ऊ ū, Ū	ए e, E	ऐ ai, Ai
ओ o, O	औ au, Au	अं ṁ, Ṃ	anusvara

#### अः ḥ, Ḥ visarga

ऋ ṛ, Ṛ	ॠ ṙ, Ṛ	ऌ ḷ, Ḹ	ॡ ḻ, Ḽ	s ' avagraha
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### Consonants

क k, K	च c, C	ट ṭ, Ṭ	त t, T	प p, P
ख kh, Kh	छ ch, Ch	ठ ṭh, Ṭh	थ th, Th	फ ph, Ph
ग g, G	ज j, J	ड ḍ, Ḍ	द d, D	ब b, B
घ gh, Gh	झ jh, Jh	ढ ḍh, Ḍh	ध dh, Dh	भ bh, Bh
ङ ṅ, Ṇ	ञ ñ, Ñ	ण ṇ, Ṇ	न n, N	म m, M
य y, Y	र r, R	ल l, L	व v, V	
श ś, Ś	ष ṣ, Ṣ	स s, S	ह h, H	
क्ष kṣa, Kṣa	त्र tra, Tra	ज्ञ jña, Jña		

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

Ayer	A.J.Ayer
Black	Black Basil
Brh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Chomsky	Noam Chomsky
Derrida	Jacques Derrida
Dummett,	Michael Dummett
Ewing	A.C. Ewing
Frege	Gottlob Frege
HR.	Helārāja's Prakāśa Commentary on Vākyapadīya, part III of Bhartṛhari
Hume	David Hume
M.B.	Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali
M.B.Dīpikā	Mahābhāṣya dīpikā of Bhartṛhari
N.M.	Nyāya Mañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa
Pāṇini	Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
Pradīpa	Mahābhāṣya Pradīpatīkā of Kaiyaṭa
Pūṇyarāja	Pūṇyarāja's Commentary on the second part of Vākyapadīya
Putnam	Hilary Putnam
Quine	W.V.O. Quine
Strawson	Strawson P.F.,
Stevenson	Stevenson C.L.,
Sūtra	Sūtras of Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
Vārtika	Vārtika of Kātyāyana on Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
VP.	Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari
VP.I	I <sup>st</sup> part (Brahman Kāṇḍa) of Vākyapadīya, edited with Harivṛtti and Ambākartṛī ṭīkā from Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi, India.

VP.II	II <sub>nd</sub> part (Vākya - Kāṇḍa) of Vākyapadīya, Edited with Puṅyarāja's and Ambākarṭī ṭīkā, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi, India
VP.III	III <sub>rd</sub> part (Prakīrṇa kāṇḍa) of Vākyapadīya, Helārāja's Prakāśa Commentary and Ambākarṭī ṭīkā.
Vṛtti on VP.	Harīvṛtti of Bhartṛhari on Ist part of Vākyapadīya
Vṛṣabha	Commentary of ŚrīVṛṣabha on II <sub>nd</sub> part of Vākyapadīya
Wittgenstein	Ludwig Wittgenstein

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## INTRODUCTION

Language is power and the power of powers. It performs communication. Collecting, associating, separating, analyzing and synthesizing, praising, interpreting and evaluating, acquiring and giving, agreeing and disagreeing, decision and resolve, confusion and clarity, and all powers are exercised by language. What we preach and what we learn are infused by language. The treasure of our ancestors is all preserved by language. Language infuses cognition or thoughts and therefore, the primacy of language in human life and thought. Conclusively, language is the system of our intellect. Life is guided by thoughts infused by language, is the best definition of humans. Taking this definition into consideration, the spiritual function and aim of language get very close to life and philosophy of language becomes more lively and interesting.

Consciousness, at human level, is perceptive to a state that it flashes; it knows the flashes, analyzes and reflects over them and still all these activities are flashes of consciousness. This flashing orientation of human consciousness is such that, whenever, it flashes, is present and whatever it flashes is intelligible beings. The data acquired through senses and memory is instrumental in flashing. Even the sensory and memory data are also known when they flash and the flashing is always present. Past and future are also known so only when they flash out at present. Logically, before a flash to take place, it is a flash that is present and that with the next flash in sequence becomes the past. Thus, present is open, it gives life to past and future but is not confined or determined by past and future things or events. Conjecture and memory, data and senses all are known in present because they flash only in present. The question significantly arises as to what determines or defines these flashings or cognition? We cannot know anything if it is not determinate; even indeterminate is known thus only determinately. We know that external things are limited or determined by qualities-definite time, space, shape and size, form and color which the senses grasp in the form of sensory data but what determines their cognition? Cognition is not a thing to be defined by qualities of the things we perceive. Cognition is flashings of consciousness and we know them determinately because language infuses them. No flashing is possible isolated from language. Conclusively, language infuses cognition; this infusion is the cause of cognition as determinate. It is determinate because cognition is expressed by language. The idea that is, the concept-language and the meaning non-differently expressed by language are only objects that flash; they are not abstractions; they are self-restrained beings of awareness in nature and, in contrast with the external objects as primary existence, they are intelligible beings or existences to which our cognition is confined to. There may be concepts given in the mind but we know them only when they flash, that is, thought or idea we know. Thus, we do not know the concepts but flashing of the concepts and, thus, all words and sentences are concepts we know as and when they flash and they flash only when presented so by language.

Is there any way out to free philosophy from metaphysics? Still in the name of doing philosophy, we are engaged in some or other sort of doing metaphysics. Effort of empiricism and logical positivism to prove meaninglessness of metaphysical sentences was a great start but, in fact, it was a move for constructing metaphysics of experience against that of popular metaphysics of transcendence. The attitude, as we observe with Linguistic philosophers, is borrowed from rationalists in the form of their philosophy of duality of reference and referents. Referent or meaning, according to them, is transcendental to reference or language. This effort gives primacy to meaning and declares language as dead unless some meaning is attached to it.

References are taken as a concrete series of ink/chalk mark or of verbal noises/utterances. They consider language as a sign system having a conventional value of indicating the entities viz. physiological, mental or transcendental. It is only indicator or pointer and it cannot touch the meaning as such which is transcendental to it. Language game and the use theory of language of Wittgenstein is the best outcome of his perspective that language and thought are different; the latter is transcendental to former and the former has no value of its own except any use provides it. The meaning of the uses is decided on the basis of factors like context, association, conventions, etc., which are neither language nor meaning. Primary concern of Wittgenstein and his followers is clarification of meaning and, thus, they are involved in understanding meaning to give life to language but how can the transcendental referent give life to the reference which in - itself, according to them, is dead. The analysis and translation of thought through the reference will not be possible if thought is transcendental to language. This view, in fact, leads to blockade of the current of thought they were pursuing. Consequently, no new thought except some interpretations, is emerging.

Popularly there are two perspectives about perceiving language.

#### 1. Metaphysical understanding of language:

For this view, language is a pointer to or an indicator to things (metaphysical, physical, mental, etc.). It has an ontological origin and functions for referring the things ontic in nature. It points to things and the things are known by inference or presumption. In order to be known the referent pointed by language depends on sources like inference and presumption which also are not more than logical gestures to approach the cognition. Language, as reference, designation, representation and like are examples of metaphysical understanding of language.

#### 2. Cognitive understanding of language:

Cognition is flash of which language is expresser. The referring function of language cannot be denied but we will be deprived of estimating the actual function of language if we limit our investigation to the metaphysical understanding of language. Cognitive perspective of language believes in the active theory of knowledge. Language, according to this perspective, is expressive force; it expresses itself its own nature first that acts as an expresser of the expressed, that is, meaning. The difference between the metaphysical and the cognitive understanding of language must be kept in mind for a proper evaluation of philosophy about the objects we know. According to the former, the object, that is, referent is transcendental or exterior to language that is reference and is independent from language. In case of the latter theory, both the language and meaning are intelligible beings that we can know as expresser and the expressed. The mind can presume but cannot know things exterior to intelligible being.

Investigation into the 'Dynamics of the Language' is free from any amalgamation of metaphysical or ontic entities and our allegiance to them. It works out with the language and the meaning as the only intelligible beings to which our cognition and, hence, philosophical reflections are not only based on but also are confined to. Language expresses meaning independently of any ontic, which is, physiological, psychological, religious entities and our allegiances to them. Unlike the Western language philosophers, language and thought, for us, are infused in a way that language is thought and to deny language as thought is to deny any cognitive/philosophical activity. If language is not accepted as thought or concept-language, how can analysis of language by language be possible?

All words are concepts; we know them when and how they flash. Language is flash of consciousness; it is awareness in nature that is concept-language garbed through the articulations and their scripting which are popularly called language by proxy. It is expresser and expresses itself its own nature from which meaning is expressed non-differently. Relation between the two is the natural fitness of the former to express the later. Thus, the analysis and interpretation of cognition as presented by language is an open field where one has always a space for confronting with problems and reflecting over them for clarity and resolve. Unlike the Western Representationists and Essentialists who place meaning that is transcendental to language in the center of reflections and investigate into it by searching appropriate words for making it understandable by approximation, the book gives primacy to language and perceives meaning as that the language expresses. The logic of language as expression helps one to understand the nature of cognition as infused with language. Only language can determine the cognition because it infuses cognition. Language is not confined to verbal articulations and scripts that stand by proxy for articulations. Had there been no concept-language, there will be no incentive to speak and for speaking, no cause of expectancy to produce verbal articulations. Cognition is flashing of the concepts and comprises of the intelligible beings of language and meaning. The intelligible being of language is imposed on the language as reference and the meaning as referent, the external basis of the intelligible beings respectively. As the ontological substratum of intelligible beings, the consciousness is inferred. In any case, our cognition is based on and is confined to these intelligible beings as the object of cognition. Since concept-language is ubiquitous, communication, through the garbs used in a language speaking community is possible. The ubiquity principle of concept-language makes our communication and conversions possible; it provides us with a view of cognition as disinterested which when imposed on our passions and allegiances to things and theories, becomes interested. Philosophy of language has a spiritual goal that is, to practice avoiding the cognition being interested and to concentrate on the cognition as such, that is, the way to wisdom.

Dynamics of language is an outcome of my long experiences of teaching and research on the problems of Philosophy of language. Part of it is a modified form of my lectures well discussed in seminars and conferences and published earlier. Most of the Indian and Western controversy on problems of language, being and cognition are analyzed and interpreted afresh from the holistic approach to cognition by language. The problems discussed in the present volumes are useful not only for the scholars who do philosophy or who have philosophizing expertise and skill but for the teachers, researchers and students also having philosophy of language in their Master and graduation curriculum.

The great impact of Bhartṛhari on shaping my philosophical understanding can well be seen in my dealing with the problems. Language is expresser; meaning is what the language expresses and the two are non-different. "Language infuses cognition" is the basic view for a holistic analysis of cognition. Cognition is the flashing of consciousness and consciousness in case of us, the language speaking persons, flashes through the verbal noises, written marks, gestures and the sense data we acquire through senses. The term 'garb' I use, comprises all the instruments that help manifestation of the concept-language. Verbal articulations, written marks, gestures, data derived by senses, signs, symbols, are garbs that help manifestation of the language as thought or concept-language.

Our cognition is confined only to the intelligible beings or ideas of language and the meaning non-differently expressed by the language. In very precise, the same awareness/ idea or the

flashing of consciousness, from the point of view of expresser is language and from the point of view of expressed is the meaning; they are only beings or intelligible existences (sampratyayātmaka) that we can know. These are the main arguments the book carries in discussing the problems. Language as idea or concept is existence; in contrast to external things as primary existence; it is intelligible existence, a constant content that is manifested by garbs and, being manifested, it reveals its own nature from which its meaning is expressed non-differently. From the perspective of this argument, cognition is not only based on but is confined only to what the language expresses and the language expresses itself its own nature from which its meaning is expressed non-differently.

Cognition is determinate, disinterested and self - veridical. It is determinate because it is infused by language and is disinterested because it is not private or personal. It is not only public but ubiquitous principle also. Language directly expresses cognition without any dependency on things and our allegiances to them. Cognition, as such, is disinterested and interested knowledge emerges only when the determinate cognition expressed by language independently of external existences and our allegiances to them, is imposed on our passions, emotions, physiological, psychological, cultural and religious things and our allegiance to them. This perspective paves the way to concentrate on the cognition that flashes directly by the language; a way of life to free ourselves from imposition of cognition on things and our allegiances to them. If otherwise, there is no way to free us from our being captive to some or the other things and their allegiances. Living with things and our allegiance to them, we start living with past and ignoring present that only we know. We start living memories and overlook the function and nature of intelligible beings. That is, we should concentrate on disinterested cognition and practice avoiding knowing by imposing and feeling pain and pleasure accordingly which are not cognition, as such, but imposition of cognition on our allegiances only. Philosophy differentiates what is distinctly and determinately cognized by language and its imposition on emotions, passions and other allegiances. This is why we give importance to the spiritual goal of philosophy of language.

The spiritual goal places the philosophy of language as a royal road to liberation. It is freedom from the captive of some or the other things, theories and their allegiance. In the way to liberation, experiencing, analyzing and reflecting over different ideologies coming from different great sources, is no more obstacles. The problem lies in the fact that we stick to this or that ideology and our journey to spirit or say to freedom is imprisoned to that. Going through, observing and evaluating different ideologies given by the master of the great traditions is needed. Wisdom can dawn on intellect only when one distinctly knows ideologies of the different tradition on any problem. Intellect cannot be cultivated to the level of wisdom, if it operates through a tube of passions and allegiances only.

Attempts have been made to reflect over the problem of cognition independently of any intermixing with metaphysical and religious referents and presumptions. No idea is taken for granted without proper analysis, reflection and thorough discussion in the light of advancement of knowledge. Unlike the history of Indian philosophy written earlier, present work can satisfy the intellectual need of those who do not get any new taste, get no inspiration and excitement from the books written earlier on history of Indian Philosophy on one hand and the books written on Grammarian's philosophy from a metaphysical perspective on the other hand. Metaphysics and ontology, interpreting world as the appearance or as caused by some material or spiritual agency are outmoded, and the intellectuals and academicians do not want to waste their time and labor on metaphysical designing of thoughts.

Metaphysical issues are also observed in this work from the perspective of the cognitive approach to the problems that is, as they figure or presented by language in usual communication. By cognitive approach, I mean observation, analysis, determination and resolve of the problems on the basis of cognition, as it figures or is expressed when presented so by language. The cognitive holistic interpretation of the philosophy of language has succeeded in uncovering the powers of language in a way that it culminates in giving a new meaning to the autonomy of language, disinterestedness of cognition, meaning of moral language and the holistic theory of language, being and cognition. Language is not confined to articulate utterances or written marks we use for articulations which are known so because of the constant content existing as thought, that is, thought level of language. Herein, the different theories of language namely, spōṭa theory of language, indivisibility theory of language, autonomy theory of language, cognitive holistic theory of language are well analyzed and discussed from the cognitive perspective.

This set of two volumes do not deny but examines the merits and demerits of reference and representative theories of language; it undertakes the functional analysis of language also for discussion and, finally, views that unlike those theories, the language for expressive theory is power; it is expressive power and any mode of expression whether it is referential, representational or functional are the expressions of those modes of uses. Language expresses all modes of expressions that we know and, that there is nothing we know but that is not expressed by language. In brief, the expressive theory of language is the theory of infusion of cognition by language.

Language is not only a tool, a mark, pointer or reference to the thing outside or inside; it is expresser. Had it been different from meaning, the meaning independently of language cannot be determined by language. "Language infuses cognition" simply means that the cognition is determinate. Nothing, accept language, can determinate the cognition. An external thing take 'book' is determined by the size, shape, color and the content we perceive. But the cognition of 'book' is not determined by those qualities. The language 'book' expresses the idea 'book'. This determination is not possible if language does not infuse the cognition.

Most of the problems that make thinking on philosophy of language a close system or an illogical product of a logical skill is based on confusing nature of language as confined to it as reference and meaning as referent. The utter blunder with representationist's philosophy is the referent as meaning which is transcendental to language. Language, in the reference theory is just an indicator and it can only indicate but cannot make the object known. Cognition is the flashing of consciousness revealed and infused by language. The meaning and the language are different in a way that one cannot determine the other and, hence no meaning different from language are acceptable. In expressive theory, meaning is an intelligible being and that is expressed by language only.

Meaning is approached generally as that for the conveying of which the language is a tool. Representative theorist like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gottlob Frege, Michael Dummett, W.V.O. Quine and Davidson are of the view that language is reference and the thing, it refers to, in experience, is the referent. The reference is material and the referent or meaning may be material or thought, and hence, the two can be related only by a link. Mind can be a link but the subordination of meaning to mind as a link has to be accepted. Do we know mind as such or we know only the idea of 'mind'? If mind as idea is known then how can the idea of mind be a link in between the two ideas? It will lead ad infinitum. If we assume that we can know only the relation

of two material entities, that is, reference and referent as material thing, then what is that relation? On this issue they say that thought is awareness but different from and independent in nature from the reference. The language is material and the meaning being awareness is always separate and independent from the reference. Language does not touch the meaning; it only indicates the meaning that is transcendental to language. In such a situation, the problem of analysis and translation becomes difficult to resolve. No analysis of language then will be the analysis of meaning, if meaning is separate and transcendental to language. Anyway, the analysis of language will not be the analysis of meaning; meaning being transcendental, is beyond the grasp of language. The language can indicate the meaning; can refer to but it cannot determinate the meaning because the latter is separate from the language.

There are two sorts of major approaches to the nature of language. Indian Systems of orthodox and heterodox and the Western Representationists like Wittgensteinian's approach to Language as reference and meaning as thought and the cognitive holistic approach to language as expresser and meaning as expressed both make philosophical enquiry into the dynamics of language in different ways. For those who accept language as reference, language, as such, has no meaning; it is dead but it is with its attachment to a meaning that language becomes alive. In this situation the theorists face following problems.

i. The theorists accept language and thought, reference and referent, separate from each other in a way that the latter is transcendental to the former cause many apparent problems and cannot be paid much now in a philosophy of language; it has blocked the flow of philosophical reflections and no new thoughts in the field are emerging.

ii. Language can only indicate the referent from outside but it cannot make it known determinately. Knowledge is always a determinate knowledge and nothing but language can only determinate cognition. We perceive and collect the sense data of a thing but unless the data flashes as idea, we cannot know that and that determination of idea is not possible if it is not infused with language. For example, the senses donot provide us with the knowledge of 'cow'; they donot perceive 'cowness'. The sense-data of 'cow', consisting of a specific form of the bodily parts, some actions, qualities of which all or none, separately or collectively, is cow. 'Cow' is in order to be known 'cow' requires the word 'cow-wordness' that is not acquired by senses but serves as sole cause of expressing 'cow' through the sense-data of 'cow'. No idea is possible without language; cognition is determinately expressed and known because the language determines it.

iii. According to representationists, as I understand, reference - referent relation is between a thing and another thing transcendental to the former. Reference cannot touch the referent; language cannot touch the meaning which is transcendental to the former, and ,thus, any knowledge of referent by the indication of reference is just a conjecture that may like information point to but cannot make known ; it may be that, by proportion, it can make the transcendental known but there is no room for appropriation because referents, in the empirical or transcendental world, are transcendental to reference and, hence, by whose approximation the transcendental meaning that is beyond language will be known? In that case, if the referent/meaning is transcendental to language, no knowledge will be possible.

iv. Placing meaning in the center of philosophical reflections, the representationists and the essentialists try to search for the language that can appropriately represent the meaning. If the

basic idea is that meaning is transcendental to language, no language, no word can make the meaning, which is transcendental to it, known.

v. If meaning is transcendental to language, it is not given to us for analysis. Only language is in our disposal for being analyzed. We analyze language for what? The answer from the representationists is that for clarity of thought. If thought is transcendental, the analysis and translation of language will not then be the analysis and translation of thought. No meaning will be determinate and no analysis of language be the analysis of meaning and, thus, the purpose of analysis is defeated.

vi. A word gets a meaning in context of its use. But the context of convention and variation of the uses and according to uses variation of meaning make the use theory of meaning problematic not only for philosophical reflection but for an ordinary communication also. Convention is set on with an individual and that is followed in the use of the language but representationists use theory for which meaning varies with the variation of uses of the same word makes both the language and the meaning a mess. Contextual meaning may be interpreted in tune with convention. However, context is neither a language nor a meaning; it is ultra-virus and needs to be decided with the convention.

What is the relation between the language and the thought or meaning if the former is material while the latter is awareness or intelligible object? Convention, commonness context, etc. are experiences and, hence, facts because all experiences are facts as per Wittgensteinians. But relation is to be found always in between the two facts or relata. Convention is with individual while the words are used for all their meaning, that is, universal and, there can be no convention with universal.

Unlike language philosophers of the West, cognitive holism, do not perceive that problems are caused by the misuse of the language; they, for us, emerge by the misunderstanding of the meaning the language expresses. It perceives that language is power and can express any meaning which others may find even beyond context. Thus, being potency, language can express all sorts of meanings belonging to the context of referents –empirical and transcendental and is not limited to any or some sorts of expressions only. It does express all sorts of the meaning of the words that are categorized as primary, secondary and tertiary meanings. A word is naturally fit to express all meanings. The difference of meanings expressed by a word is based on primary meaning of the word. Convention is also a power and it plays its own role in the use of the word. Convention is not relation as such, it limits the relation to a particular meaning. Convention is not one and the same. It is observed at different level but, at all levels of meanings, the primary meaning of the word is given primacy. The primary or popular meaning is taken expressive and other meanings -the intended and non-intended of the same word is known by imposition of primary meaning. Tertiary meaning is known by the proximity of the primary meaning. For example the proper noun ‘cow’ expresses primary meaning that is universal ‘cowness’ and the intended use of the word ‘cow’ for a stupid or lazy man or cowherd is intended or secondary and the number, gender of the cow, known by the proximity with primary meaning, is tertiary meaning of the word. Non-referent, non-context, non-existence, contradictory, doubt etc., are the meanings known by the use of these words only.

Philosophy of language can be misled from its purpose if it takes meaning transcendental to language and puts meaning in the center of philosophical activity because then, it would try to

search the appropriate world or language to convey the transcendental that it can never do. Indication to a transcendental is an appropriation that varies from one to the other philosopher and all appropriation, proportionating lastly culminate into a great confusion about the proper understanding of meaning by language, that is, quite separate from and never touches to the transcendental meaning. This is an underestimation of the powers of language that is given only in their hand for analysis and interpretation. Analysis and interpretation of the language, then, will be no more than the same of that which is transcendental and separate from language. The tool cannot cook. In any case no cognition, that is, meaning being awareness, be known by language and the language itself cannot figure as thought. If it figures as thought, then, there will be no difference between language and thought and the same is truism because language, in active theory of cognition, expresses itself first through articulations and the same figures as meaning as well. Language not only expresses our thoughts but is thought itself; it infuses the thoughts that are what we estimate by the creativity of language. Thus, the infusion thesis of language and thought is the only refuge that makes the analysis and interpretation of language an analysis and interpretation of thought as well.

Against expression theory, it can be charged that ‘the expresser at the same time is expressed’, contradicts itself. This is not true to say because the expresser is called so because it expresses it’s expressed and, in the process, the expresser expresses itself first and only then it expresses its expressed or meaning non-differently. We do not accept simultaneous cognition. Consequently, the word flashes its nature first from which its meaning is expressed. There is no possibility of philosophy if we presume meaning separate and transcendental to language and confine language as what we speak and write that is verbal noises and scripts because the former cannot be grasped by language and the latter cannot touch the former. Contrasting to it, interpretation of cognition by language demands a view for which language infuses thought. Value of cognition by language and scripture will just be inference and this amounts to an underestimation of the power of language.

Cognition is expressed by language independently of senses and the data derived on their basis which is just instrumental in the manifestation of the intelligible language. What is expressed is verity or veridical cognition; they are flashes of consciousness that, for the sake of understanding into piecemeal, is divided grammatically and philosophically and is verified on the basis of availability and non-availability of referent in experience to satisfy logical skill. Thus, reference – referent verification is just a logical measure for which the meaning of only those words having referent in experience is verifiable. In holistic theory of cognition, thing or referent may be or may not be in experience but the cognition is accomplished when the language expresses them so and then we search a corresponding referent to verify that cognition.

These volumes analyze minutely and discuss at large almost all popular theories on the meaning. The meanings of words, prefixes, suffixes and different theories of the word, the sentence, the word-meaning, the sentential- meaning and the theories of verbal cognition have been discussed coping up with the arguments and counter arguments of the rival theories. It is, perhaps, for the first time that philosophy, independently of metaphysical and religious entities and presumptions, is viewed, as confined to the intelligible beings of language and meaning as the only object of cognition and reflections. These intelligible beings are only philosophical objects we know directly by the language.



One may say that it is pain that makes one an intelligent but, we know that there is difference between clever and intelligent. The experience of adversities, pain, etc., can make one clever like foxes and wolves but, in all cases, if one follows the flashes of the consciousness and does not impose them on emotions and passions or on our allegiance to things and thoughts, he is intelligent. If we confine to flashes and the incentive to action caused by them and do accordingly without deviation, there will be no conflict, no pain, no pleasure blended with pain. This is the state of functioning of the spirit in a natural way and is a natural way of living as well. This is what we call the act of the right intellect. The former is light while the latter is cleverness that is, ignorance. In the former intellect is involved but in case of cleverness we search intellect to justify clever. If we claim to be wise but we do not rise above the conduct based on imposition, we are not intelligent but clever that can always be guided by passions and emotions. There are persons who are addicted with cleverness in such a way that throughout the life they live a life without using talent. They never feel a rational hunger; they never become reflective to find out a solution to the problem for clarity and wisdom. Cognition is light; it is the guide in matter of conducts. Human life with awareness is always blissful; a life of awareness is the life of human.

No problem is a problem for itself; all problems are problems for a reflecting mind that confronts with the problem; all problems are at thought level and can be solved by thinking and reflecting. Cognitive holistic interpretation of language, herein, prescribes all the means required for cultivation of rationality and conduct because only that way one's mind can attain pure knowledge. Knowledge and ignorance both are illuminated only when they are cognized so and we know their difference by cognizing them only. When we concentrate on them as they figure in cognition, we confront with problems, if any, and then, we analyze them, reflect over them to remove, resolve and get clarity and wisdom.

Whether cognition is interested or disinterested is also distinctly known by the use of words. Distinct and determinate cognition by language has a concern with a spiritual purpose. Philosophizing, the practices of controlling the interested knowledge, is cultivation of the intellect and, finally, understanding and practice of disinterested knowledge that is, pure knowledge or wisdom is the outcome of the cultivation. It is the practicing of simplicity against complicated; getting rid of allegiances to freedom of spirit where all the possibility of meaning and language is open. It is a remedy against sickness of thoughts; freedom from the ills of thought, defective, misguided thinking, etc. It perceives that one cannot hope to excel in the philosophizing, if one rushes with his own prejudiced reasoning. Intellect can get pure knowledge discriminately by going through the sources of wisdom practiced by different traditions.

Some of the problems, specifically, Autonomy thesis of language, Ontic non-being versus Intelligible being, Language and Possibility of disinterested knowledge, Language and logic of translation and Analysis, Language and Grammar, Language and Communication, Language and Culture, Meaning of Moral Expression and cognitive holistic understanding of language, much less explored from contemporary perspective, are discussed conclusively that makes the book pioneer in proper understanding of these concepts in a comparison with the Western counterpart. The novelty of rest of the chapters lies in analyzing the concepts, interpreting them in comparison with the Indian and the Western counterparts and concluding them in a way that makes the presentation useful for the understanding of students and teachers. The idea of giving incentive to further researches in the field has been taken well care of in the discussion and that is evident from the analysis and scheme of presentation in the contents. The language and arguments in the book are quite simple and can be understood by any reader interested to know the dynamics of

language in modern idioms .The book successfully keeps the promise of analyzing and interpreting the cognition by language afresh without any amalgamation of metaphysical, physiological, psychological entities and allegiance to them. Pure knowledge is the asylum.

Devendra Nath Tiwari

Professor of Philosophy and Religion,

Banaras Hindu University,

Varanasi 221005.