

**VOLUME II**

**DYNAMICS OF THE LANGUAGE**

**(Philosophy of the World of the Words)**

**DEVENDRA NATH TIWARI**

## Scheme of Transliteration

### Vowels

Devanāgarī	Transcription					
अ a, A	आ	ā, Ā	इ	I, I	ई	ī, Ī
उ u, U	ऊ	ū, Ū	ए	e, E	ऐ	ai, Ai
ओ o, O	औ	au, Au	अं	ṁ, Ṃ	anusvara	

### अः ḥ, Ḥvisarga

ऋ ṛ, Ṛ	ॠ	ṛ, Ṛ	ऌ	ḷ, Ḹ	ॡ	ḷ, Ḹ	s ' avagraha
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### Consonants

क k, K	च	c, C	ट	ṭ, Ṭ	त	t, T	प	p, P
ख kh, Kh	छ	ch, Ch	ठ	ṭh, Ṭh	थ	th, Th	फ	ph, Ph
ग g, G	ज	j, J	ड	ḍ, Ḍ	द	d, D	ब	b, B
घ gh, Gh	झ	jh, Jh	ढ	ḍh, Ḍh	ध	dh, Dh	भ	bh, Bh
ङ ṅ, Ṇ	ञ	ñ, Ñ	ण	ṇ, Ṇ	न	n, N	म	m, M
य y, Y	र	r, R	ल	l, L	व	v, V		
श ś, Ś	ष	ṣ, Ṣ	स	s, S	ह	h, H		
क्ष kṣa, Kṣa	त्र	tra, Tra	ज्ञ	jña, Jña				

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

Ayer	A.J.Ayer
Black	Black Max
Brh. Up.	BṛhadāraṇyakaUpaniṣad
Chomsky	Noam Chomsky
Derrida	Jacques Derrida
Dummett,	Michael Dummett
Ewing	A.C. Ewing
Frege	GottlobFrege
HR.	Helārāja'sPrakāśa Commentary on Vākyapadīya, part III of Bhartṛhari
Hume	David Hume
M.B.	Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali
M.B.Dīpikā	Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari
N.M.	Nyāya Mañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa
Pāṇini	Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
Pitcher	George Pitcher
Pradīpa	MahābhāṣyaPradīpatīkā of Kaiyaṭa
Pūṇyarāja	Pūṇyarājā's Commentary on the second part of Vākyapadīya
Putnam	Hilary Putnam
Quine	W.V.O. Quine
Rorty	Richard Rorty
Strawson	P.F.Strawson
Stevenson	C.L. Stevenson
Sūtra	Sūtras of Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
Tarski	Alfred Tarski
Vārtika	Vārtika of Kātyāyana on Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini

VP.	Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari
VP.I	I <sub>st</sub> part (Brahman Kāṇḍa) of Vākyapadīya, edited with Harivṛtti and Ambākarṭī ṭīkā from Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi,India.
VP.II	II <sub>nd</sub> part (Vākya - Kāṇḍa) of Vākyapadīya, Edited with Puṇyarāja's and Ambākarṭī ṭīkā, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi,India
VP.III	III <sub>rd</sub> part (Prakīrṇa kāṇḍa)of Vākyapadīya, Helārāja's Prakāśa Commentary and Ambākarṭī ṭīkā.
Vṛtti on VP.	Harivṛtti of Bhartṛhari on Ist part of Vākyapadīya
Vṛṣabha	Commentary of ŚrīVṛṣabha on II <sub>nd</sub> part of Vākyapadīya
Wittgenstein	Ludwig Wittgenstein

## CONTENT

<b>Scheme of Transliteration</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>List of Abbreviation</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Table of Contents</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1:</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>LANGUAGE AND THE THOUGHT</b>	
(DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE CONTROVERSY)	7
1.0. The Problem,	7
1, 1.Indian philosophical systems and Western philosophers approaches to the concept language and the thought:	7
1.2. Critique of the Representation Theory of Language:	9
1.3. Arguments and counter arguments,	12
1.4. Controversy over determinate, indeterminate cognition and abstraction,	14
1.5. On Proposition and Thought,	15
1.6. External being and intelligible being,	17
1.7. Language and possibility of its study and analysis by language,	22
1.8. Language and possibility of expressions,	23
1.9. Conclusion.	23
<b>CHAPTER-II:</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>LANGUAGE &amp; GRAMMAR:</b>	<b>26</b>
2.0. The Problem,	

2.1. Controversy on the primacy of language versus grammar,	27
2.2. Language embedded in grammar vis-a vis grammar embedded in language,	29
2.3. Grammar is practice,	30
2.4. Grammar (vyākaraṇa) is smṛti,	31
2.5. Patañjali's definition of Grammar,	33
2.6. Grammar as the discipline of leaning and cultivating language (Śabdānuśāsana)	34
2.7. Purpose of learning Grammar according to Patañjali,	35
2.8. Bhartṛhari on Grammar,	36
2.9. Grammar and Critique of laws of thought,	38
2.10. Grammar is never an Ideal,	39
2.11. Meaning & Grammar,	39
2.12. Is Grammar convention?	41
2.13. Conclusion,	42
<b>CHAPTER III:</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE AND LOGIC OF</b>	
<b>TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS</b>	<b>44</b>
3.0. The problem,	44
3.1. Three models of Interpretation of Translation,	44
3.2. Two popular logic of Translation,	46
3.3. Critique of B.K. Matilal's observation on Translation,	47
3.4. Problem of a good and a bad Translation	49
3.5. Response to Derrida's objection to Transcendental signified,	51
3.6. Problem of Analysis	54
3.7. Conclusion.	55

<b>CHAPTER-IV:</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>TEXT, RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND DETERMINATION OF MEANING</b>	<b>59</b>
4.0. What do I mean by a Text?	59
4.1. The Veda, the text ,	60
4.2. Problem of identity & difference of the text,	63
4.3. Problem of Interpretation,	65
4.4. Mīmāṃsā Method of Interpretation,	67
4.4.1. Mimāṃsā method is scientific,	67
4.4.2. Six fold approach to Interpretation,	68
4.4.3. Elementary Principles of Interpretation,	68
4.4.4. General rules of Interpretation,	68
4.4.5. Specific rules of discrimination and determination of the Text,	69
4.4.6. General Principles of Application of Text,	70
4.4.7. Rules regarding Character and Interpretation of Smṛti -text and Usage,	70
4.5. Bhartṛhari on Interpretation of the Text,	71
4.5.1. Three ways of Interpretation of Text,	72
4.5.2. Prescriptive sentences (vidhi -vākyas),	74
4.5.3. Prohibitive sentences (pratiśedhavākyas),	75
4.5.4. Difference of meaning by Interpretation through words and sentence as a whole,	76
4.6. Interpretation of Word-meaning,	77
4.7. Grounds for determination and Interpretation of Intended meanings (gaunārtha)	78

4.7.1. Purpose, situation-context and proximity of another word,	78
4.7.2. Base and that which is based on it,	78
4.7.3. More or less of the properties of the object indicated by a word,	79
4.7.4. Similarity,	79
4.7.5. Inversion,	79
4.7.6. Form and potency (rūpa-śakti),	80
4.8. Determination of the meanings inseparably associated /Non-intended meaning of word (Nāntarīyakārtha),	82
4.8.1. Inversion of the sense of primary and secondary (Guṇapradhānatāviparyaya),	83
4.8.2. Non-expectancy of a part of meaning (Padārthaikadeśavivakṣā),	83
4.8.3. Non-expectancy of the complete meaning of the word (Sakalapadārthavivakṣā),	83
4.8.4. Non-intended meaning is known by implication without a relegation of the expressive meaning of the word: (Upāttapadārthaparityāgenaiva' nyarthopalakṣaṇa),	85
4.9. Determinants of Contextual –meaning,	86
4.9.1. The sentence of which the word is a part (vākyatā),	87
4.9.2. Context (prakaraṇa),	88
4.9.3. Meaning of another word of the sentence (artha),	89
4.9.4. Propriety (aucitya),	89
4.9.5. Place (deśa),	89
4.9.6. Time (kāla),	90
4.9.7. Association (sansarga),	90
4.9.8. Dissociation (vīprayoga)	90
4.9.9. Resemblance (sāhacarya),	90
4.9.10. Opposition (vīrodha),	91



4.9.11. Indication from another expression (linga),	91
4.9.12. Proximity of another word (śabdāntarasannidhāna),	91
4.9.13. Capacity (sāmarthya),	91
4.9.14. Gender (vyakti),	92
4.9.15. Accent (svara).	92
4.10. Conclusion.	93

## **CHAPTER-V: 96**

### **LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 96**

5.0. Introduction,	96
5.1. Different approached to language and culture,	96
5.2. Limit of Knowledge and culture,	98
5.3. Culture is creativity,	99
5.4. Relation between Language and Culture,	100
5.5. On Scripture and Culture,	106
5.6. Conclusion,	109

## **CHAPTER VI: 111**

### **LANGUAGE, BEING AND COGNITION 111**

6.0. Introduction,	111
6.1. Holistic theory of Sentence,	111
6.2. Two sorts of approaches to Language,	112
6.3. Language and the problem of uniquely reals,	112
6.4. Śabda, a unity of the Garb and the Expresser,	113
6.5. Thing-in –itself, sense-data and Language,	114
6.6. External Being vs. Intelligible beings,	115

6.7. Difference between experience and knowledge?	117
6.7.1. Is knowledge the experience?	118
6.8. Is knowledge a product?	119
6.9. Is knowledge set of proposition?	120
6.10. Knowledge is self –consciousness of consciousness of the objects.	120
6.11. Knowledge, verity and verification,	120
6.12. Conclusion.	121

## **CHAPTER VII: 124**

### **LANGUAGE AND REALITY**

#### **(A STATEMENT ABOUT IT AS INTELLIGIBLE BEING) 124**

7.0. The problem,	124
7.1. Critique of Epistemological Approach to Reality,	124
7.2 Knowledge and its relation with epistemology,	125
7.3. Metaphysics and the need of Epistemology,	125
7.4. Critique of Śankara's arguments about Reality,	127
7.5. Critique of Buddhist's Approach to Reality,	130
7.6. Critique of some contemporary views about Reality,	131
7.7. Arguments against Reality as Nameable and unknowable,	132
7.8. Perception, Sense-data and logical Reality,	133
7.9. Reality: Individual/ Universal,	134
7.10. Reality as presented by Language,	136
7.11. Reality and Truth,	138
7.12. Conclusion,	140

**CHAPTER VIII: 142****LANGUAGE AND NEGATION:****(ONTIC NON-BEING (ABHĀVA) VERSUS PHILOSOPHICAL-BEING) 142**

8.0. The Problem,	142
8.1. On Negative sentences,	143
8.2. Negation as intelligible being,	145
8.3. Critique of Ontic commitment of Language,	149
8.4. Critique of Satkāryavādin's view of Negation as Ontic Being,	151
8.5. Critique of Asatkāryavādin's view on Negation as Ontic Being,	152
8.6. Critique of Vaiśeṣika's arguments on Non-Existence as Ontic Being, (controversy over it as having a form or formless),	154
8.7. Truth Condition of assertions regarding Non-Existence,	162
8.8. Conclusion,	163

**CHAPTER IX: 167****CRITIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGY 167**

9.0. The problem,	167
9.1. Different Epistemological views on Knowledge and Reality,	167
9.2. Attitude of Epistemology about knowledge,	168
9.3. Limit of Philosophical Reflections,	168
9.4. Two types of Perception- sensory and direct Perception,	169
9.5. Criticism of Reasoning and Inference,	170
9.6. Criticism of Inference: General points,	171
9.7. Refutation of Asatkāryavādin arguments of Inference,	172
9.7.1. Pūrvavat type of Inference,	173
9.7.2. Śeṣavat type of Inference,	173

9.7.3. Sāmānyatodrṣṭa type of Inference,	173
9.8. Refutation of Satkāryavādin arguments of Inference,	174
9.9. Scripture (Āgama),	175
9.10. Practice (Abhyāsa),	175
9.11. Supernatural power (Adrṣṭa),	175
9.12. Flash of Consciousness (Pratibhā),	176
9.13. Conclusion,	177

## **CHAPTER- X: 179**

### **LANGUAGE AND COGNITION:**

<b>DISINTERESTED VERSUS INTERESTED KNOWLEDGE,</b>	179
10.0. The Problem: The question of Objectivity of knowledge,	179
10.1. Critique of Abstraction,	180
10.2. Interested and Disinterested knowledge,	181
10.3. Meaning of Disinterested knowledge,	181
10.4. Knowledge is revealed by language,	183
10.5. Verity and Validity of Verbal -cognition,	185
10.6. Verbal knowledge and Convention,	186
10.7. Arguments for Disinterestedness knowledge by language,	187
10.8. Further clarifications on Disinterestedness of knowledge by language,	192
10.9. Conclusion,	197

## **CHAPTER XI: 199**

### **MEANING OF MORAL LANGUAGE 199**

11.0. The problem,	199
--------------------	-----

11.1. Centrality of Duty in Scriptures,	200
11.2. Critique of 'is-ought' dichotomy in contemporary ethical theories,	202
11.2.1. Critique of Emotive theory,	203
11.2.2. Critique of Prescriptive theory,	204
11.2.3. Expressive theory of moral sentences,	206
11.3. Indian View of action/duty oriented Language,	207
11.4. Types of Vedic sentences,	211
11.5. Expressive meaning of Moral language and the Problem of validity,	212
11.6. Meaning of Religious language	214
11.7. Conclusion,	216
 <b>CHAPTER XII:</b>	220
<b>LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION</b>	220
12.0. The problem,	220
12.1. Is Intention Communicable?	220
12.2. What do we mean by Communication?	222
12.3. Conversation and Communication,	225
12.4. Cause of Incentive to the Production of Articulate Utterances,	225
12.4.1. From the speaker's perspective,	225
12.4.2. From the Audience perspective,	226
12.5. Activities from speaker's side,	226
12.6. Activities from Audience side,	227
12.7. Production and Transmission of the Articulate utterances,	228
12.8. Critique of Chomsky's view of Communication,	229
12.9. Conclusion,	232

<b>CHAPTER XIII:</b>	234
<b>JAIN THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND INDESCRIBABILITY OF REALITY,</b>	234
13.0. The Problem: Relativistic philosophy of Jainism,	234
13.1. Substance and the logic of Syādvāda,	235
13.2. Seven fold judgments,	235
13.3. Jain Theory of Language as Representation,	236
13.4. Knowledge and the question of Describability,	237
13.5. Conclusion.	239
<b>CHAPTER XIV:</b>	241
<b>MEANING OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF BUDDHISM,</b>	241
14.0. The problem,	241
14.1. Two sorts of reality and two sources of knowing them: is Apoha not a third kind?	242
14.2. Is language an independent source of knowledge?	242
14.3. Reason behind the theory of negation of negation,	243
14.4. Meaning as Constructed Identity,	243
14.5 theory of Apoha, critical evaluation,	244
14.6. Language and Religious Experiences,	246
14.7. Brahmavihāras,	246
14.7.1. Four stages of meditation,	246
14.7.2. Three kinds of samādhis,	247
14.8. Bodhisattvahood,	247
14.9. Daśabhūmi,	248
14.10. Meaning of the religious Ideas,	248

14.11. Conclusion.	249
<b>CHAPTER XV:</b>	<b>252</b>
<b>INDIAN MATERIALISM ON ŚABDA AS AUTHORITY:</b>	<b>252</b>
15.1. The Problem:	252
15.2. Philosophical perspective of India Materialism of Cārvāka,	252
15.2.1. Mādhavāchārya's Perspective:	252
15.2.2. Jayarāśi's perspective:	253
15.3. Refutation of the theory that the word is valid source of knowledge because of it being expresser,	254
15.3.1. Comments.	255
15.4. Refutation of the theory that the word is valid source of knowledge because of it being the expression of trustworthy persons.	256
15.4.1. Comments,	257
15.5. Refutation of the theory that the Veda as valid source of knowledge because of it being Unauthored (Apauruṣeya),	257
15.5.1. Comments,	261
15.6. Refutation of the theorists who accept śabda as valid source of knowledge because of it is pointer to intention (vivakṣā) as the meaning,	262
15.6.1. Comment,	262
15.7. Refutation of Vaiyākaraṇās who hold verbal -cognition by correct form of the word (Sādhupadapadārtha),	262
15.8. Refutation of Sphoṭa theory of Grammarians,	265
15.9. Refutation of the Arguments about the definition and correctness of the word,	265
15.10. Refutation of the Arguments that the use of the word creates	

merit and demerit,	267
15.10.1. Comment,	267
15.11. General comments on Jayarāṣi's arguments for refutation of word (śabda) as Valid source of Knowledge,	268
<b>CHAPTER XVI:</b>	<b>271</b>
<b>CRITICAL ESTIMATE</b>	<b>271</b>
<b>INDEX</b>	<b>284</b>



## INTRODUCTION

It is in no way an exaggeration to say that the rich legacy of Indian thinking shares the subtlest thoughts about different possible aspects of life. It being treasure house of thoughts and understanding its value through what and how the history writers present it are different things. People of the globe evaluate generally through the tube of what is mostly represented by the modern scholars and authors of history of Indian philosophy. Since by studentship, I used to become thoughtful with the remarks made time to time by the colleagues and teachers about Indian Philosophy. No philosophy is there except heterodox and orthodox systems of Philosophy. Even today, one may get the comment of scholars sitting on apex bodies of Indian philosophy that the roots of Indian philosophy are very deep and, therefore, they are still relevant. No new philosophy is emerging that can satisfy the rational hunger of those who are sick of reading the same metaphysics in different books on the history of Indian philosophy and are in search of a philosophy satisfying their intellectual taste and the challenges they confront in the area. I am aware of glorifying attitude of the philosophy scholars about the comments that Indian philosophy is religion; metaphysical philosophy having an axiological aim that they call liberation (mokṣa); it is spiritual philosophy and metaphysics supported well by epistemology and that there is no way out of it. Contemporary Indian philosophy is a socio-ethical interpretation of the classical Indian philosophy in modern idioms. To gratify and glorify these comments with epistemological and axiological justifications and humanistic concern about philosophy as metaphysics, in India, is an escaping from serious philosophical thinking. Indian and Western scholars equally make a general remark that there is no pure philosophy or philosophy proper and that there are theories of language but not philosophy of language in India. The purpose of writing these volumes is confined neither to encounter those comments, nor to support the tradition of Pāṇini who perpetuated language as the guide in the matter of life and thought, but to present my reflections on cognition as it is expressed by language and, certainly, Pāṇinian, especially, Bhartṛhari is my guide in this endeavor. The chapters discussed herein two volumes is a work on pure philosophy that gives primacy to the understanding and analysis of cognition as it flashes; it is philosophy of language for which our cognition, communication and investigations are not only based on but is confined to the language and to what it expresses. It reflects over the cognition without any intermixing with religious and metaphysical entities and our allegiances to them.

Philosophers have attempted variously to free the thoughts from metaphysical or ontic entities, passions and emotions, our allegiances to any, from language and from language and thoughts both for achieving pure knowledge, that is, defined by different schools and philosophers as substance, quality, creativity(kriyā), nothingness (śūnya) and likewise. This is basic difference why philosophers having different views criticize and refute one another. Knowledge cannot be substance that we indicate by the pronouns this and that. Even the pronoun 'sarva' cannot indicate it as the totality, all pervading, and non-dual. All pervading substance cannot be known by sources of knowledge which are naturally fit to know their

specific objects. The eyes cannot know the objects of ears and likewise. This leads to mysticism and ultimately silence. Silence may be substance but for no use for philosophy, knowledge and communication. Knowledge being the light of the quality and quality of the qualities also cannot be a quality at the sometime. I have attempted herein thoughts free from ideologies, theories and any or all sorts of captives. A captive thought cannot be philosophical and cognition of any flashing of concept or thought as accomplished in any cognitive activity cannot be made understandable unless cognition as such, that is, free from all the things outside and inside and our allegiances to them, is not reflected. Freedom of thought is the freedom from confusing uses of language; concentrating on only the cognitive or intelligible beings, the flashes to which our cognition is confined, can only facilitate us to perceive the beings or thoughts separated from its impositions.

Freedom of thought, in my use herein, is not historical or political slogan but purely philosophical signification. It stands for cognition free from its imposition on our interests, our allegiance of which we are often captive and because of which we deviate and confuse the nature of problems, objects and purpose of philosophy proper as well. We still use the term philosophy to attract others towards that deviation. It is like the hat of socialism which every politician even those opposed to socialism likes to use as a political fashion.

We are not against the philosophical approaches made in the history, rather we want to understand what they intend to say. We must be aware of what it says but do not follow it blindly because that makes the mind lazy and one sided; that we should not be captive of all or any of them in order to excel to wisdom of our intellect. If Philosophers task is to get clarity, freedom of the cognition from its captives is a goal of our philosophical reflections. Our attempt is not to get freedom from thoughts because then there is no possibility of philosophy; thinking, knowing and reflecting process will not be possible then, but to reflect over the thoughts free from any amalgamation, its imposition on other thoughts, emotions and other captives to get it pure and then to reflect over to perceive the flash discriminately clear.

Consciousness, at human level, is flashing force; we cognize only the flashes that are intelligible beings of language, the expresser and the meaning, the expressed. In the active theory of cognition, the language expresses its own nature first from which its meaning is expressed non-differently. Our cognition, communication and reflections are not only based on but are confined to the intelligible beings of language and meaning. Cognition, even by sources like perception, inference, etc., is infused by language. Isolated from language, no knowledge is possible. Subordinating language to some ontic or psychic entity, taking it for granted as confined to material product of human speaking organs and a system of written marks/signs or a logical system, is an escaping from the serious thinking on the cognitive nature of the problem that may lead to underestimation or improper estimation of it.

There is difference between higher and highest knowledge and the pure knowledge as we have seen in volume first. Two persons having highest knowledge of their concerned

discipline can conflict for their superiority but there is no conflict on pure knowledge on which our communication is based. Pure knowledge is conceived differently by different schools as substance, quality of consciousness, as creativity of self (kṛiyā or karma) and still some other as extinction (śūnya). But they all agree that the state of purity is freedom from worldliness, that is, from ignorance with all its forms and modifications. In epistemological theories, Knowledge is given importance as empirical and as transcendental. But this epistemological approach is not relevantly sufficient in a system that reflects on cognition as determinate awareness. Knowledge is the light, the light of the lights that must be understood as it is revealed; it is awareness and in an analytic scheme, its different aspects must be reflected on, analyzed and interpreted so as to get wisdom into the holistic vision of it. Language determinates cognition in a wise and in an ignorant equally and, hence, knowledge as it is revealed by language is disinterested but ignorant impose it on their interests that causes deviated effects. Cognition is flashing of consciousness comprising intelligible beings of language and the meaning the former expresses non-differently. Cognition gets interested when imposed on things of our interests, passions, emotions and allegiances.

Cognitive holism perceives that understanding the indivisible cognition through the analytic skill has its own beauty but that must aim at clarity and conception of the indivisible cognition. Imposition of the cognition on allegiance of our interests has a different beauty but if one understands the two discriminately, as what is revealed and what is imposed, only then he can get the wisdom of perceiving different skills as ways leading to the understanding of the indivisible. For wisdom and bliss, knowledge, be freed from all that it is imposed.

Language is the potency, the energy that can function in different forms and many ways as reference, representation, designation and other illocutionary senses but in all the cases, those modes are known thus as the language expresses them so. It is not confined to speaking and listening but awareness. As awareness it is intelligible being and infuses cognition. Language is expressive by nature. The philosophization of natural language sets up the beauty of language in a way that the relation between it and its meaning follows naturally. In expressive theory, language is conceived as expresser, that is, naturally fit to express meanings independently from things ontic in nature. Cognition is determinate because the language infuses it; it is disinterested because the language expresses directly and independently of physiological, religious and other ontic entities and our allegiance to them. Language and meaning, as concepts, may be given, but we know only when these concepts flash and, thus, the flashings are in no way abstractions. Being ubiquitous principle, cognition and communication by language becomes possible. Cognition, the language reveals is the cause of incentive and guide in the matter of our duties and conduct. Spiritual goal of philosophy of language rests on concentrating on the cognition as it is expressed. Cognition, flashes by language, as such, is pure and disinterested, and any imposition of it, on external things, our infatuation with them and our allegiance with

emotions, passions, ideologies, etc., makes it interested, a follow up of which is conflicting; it causes problems.

Cognition is indivisible; the objects of cognition, that is, intelligible being of language and meaning are indivisible and for the sake of analytic understanding it into piecemeal, it is divided into syntactical parts and their semantic meaning is interpreted. But through these divisions the indivisible cognition as such is not divided. Analytic scheme, in fact, has its own power and beauty that help understanding the indivisible cognition through divisions. The practice of avoiding the cognition from being interested by ontic, psychic entities, our allegiances and passions to them and concentrating on the pure cognition as expressed directly by language is the way to wisdom.

Effort of empiricism and logical positivism, at its core, is a move for constructing metaphysics of experience against that of popular metaphysics of transcendence. A philosophy that gives primacy to referent and assumes referent separate and transcendental to reference is a metaphysical construction. Philosophizing the referent that may be abstraction or ontic existence, transcendental to reference, suffers metaphysical problem of duality of the reference and referent in a way that no consistent theory of relation between the two is possible and verbal cognition without relation of the two is not possible. Unlike the Western Representationists and Essentialists who perceive meaning transcendental to language and put meaning in the center of reflections and investigates into words for making it understandable by indication, the present volumes give primacy to language as of awareness in nature and perceive meaning as that it expresses non-differently. Unlike metaphysicians and ontologists, these volumes do not discuss language and meaning as a reality separate from cognition only but as and when flash by language or as the intelligible beings the language expresses. Only language can determine the cognition of language, meaning and the reality; it infuses cognition. Language is not confined to tools like verbal articulations and scripts that stand by proxy for articulations that only help manifestation of the intelligible being of language that, being manifested by tools, expresses itself and its meaning that are cognitive realities for a philosophical reflection.

The book is a set of two volumes each divided into symmetrically arranged twelve and sixteen chapters respectively. Volume first, is a critique of almost all popular theories of language, meaning, relation between them and the controversy on verbal-cognition examined well comparatively in the light of advancement of knowledge; it concludes in a way that culminates into a holistic philosophy of language. Volume second very effectively analyses and discusses the dynamics of language from holistic perspective of cognition. Attempt is made here for the first time to investigate into the dynamics of language; the concepts that are concerned directly with flashings or knowledge and that too in a way the analysis of those concepts is the same the analysis of knowledge. It facilitates us to understand indivisible knowledge through its different perspective. The method is not new but the benefit of the planning is that the analysis and discussion of different concepts from different perspectives help removing all doubts and inconsistencies and make those concepts

clear to the extent of cognition par excellence; at the same time the discussion on them culminates into the holistic idea of cognition. Each part of a concept is fully discussed in the book with the same respect of the whole in view of latest advancement on those concepts.

The view that 'language infuses cognition' directly values to 'all cognition is determinate'. Isolated from language determination of knowledge is not possible. Even the indeterminate is known so because the language determinately expresses it thus. It also becomes easy to understand as to why the knowledge expressed by language is always veridical. Even the knowledge of the doubt, non-veridical, contradictory and likewise are also verity because of which a doubt is taken as a doubt and so on in similar cases. Apart from verity of knowledge, the validity measure of cognition, for us, is not correspondence, or pragmatic and utilitarian measures but the accomplishment of communication by language. Communication is not confined to speaking and listening but the accomplishment of cognition by language and is possible because of language being the principle of ubiquity. The language and arguments in the book are quite simple and can be understood by any reader interested to know the philosophy of the world of the words. These volumes include almost the topics prescribed in the universities at bachelor and master level courses and furnish several topics for further researches on philosophy of language.

Some of the problems, specifically, Autonomy thesis of language, cognitive holistic understanding of language, indivisibility thesis of language, Ontic non-being versus Intelligible being, Language and Possibility of knowledge being disinterested, Language and logic of translation and Analysis, Language and Grammar, Language and Communication, Language and Culture, Meaning of Moral language, Negation, Indescribable and materialistic dialectics on language as authority much less explored from cognitive perspective are discussed conclusively that make the book pioneer in proper understanding of these concepts in a comparison with Western counterpart. The novelty of rest of the chapter's lies in analyzing the concepts, interpreting them in comparison with Indian and western counter parts and concluding them in a way that makes the presentation useful for the understanding of scholars, students and teachers. The idea of giving incentive to further researches in the field has been taken well care of in the discussion and that is evident from the analysis and scheme of presentation in the contents. The book successfully keeps the promise of analyzing and interpreting the cognition by language afresh without any amalgamation of religious, metaphysical, physiological, psychological entities and our allegiance to them. Confusion, contradiction and impossibility of the cognition of a concept follow only when concept is attempted as separated from language and the language as concept is denied. A concept isolated from language becomes lifeless, undetermined and, hence, cease to be a concept. Dynamics of language cannot be estimated if language as power is denied

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