

# **AUTONOMY THEORY OF LANGUAGE**

## **Introduction**

For a philosophical reflection, life is thought, a process of thinking and living the thoughts that are effective even on the physical and biological aspects of human beings. If the thoughts are clear, sound and positive, one enjoys wisdom and bliss but if they are diseased and negative, they kill the cells of body and blood and consequently one suffers from so many incurable diseases which kill one individually and socially, mentally and physically. Those habituated to negative thinking are found suffering from diabetes, blood pressure, and heart-attack and hells the life for no meaning or for abuse. Clarity and wisdom are outcomes of constant figuring of determinate thoughts. No cognition, no clarity is possible if the thoughts are not determinate and in determination of the thoughts the role of language is primary. The theory discussed here envisions infusion of thought and language. Isolated from language the thought ceases to be so. Language and meaning are revealed beings or are thought-objects to which philosophical reflections and investigations are confined. Infatuation of language and meaning with external entities as the object of philosophical reflections leads to confusions, doubts and illusions that mislead the philosophical conclusion of an analytic system of knowledge.

## **Critique of Contemporary Western views on Autonomy of Language**

Autonomy of language is discussed by Contemporary Western philosophers of language in Kantian sense of autonomy of freedom. Is language autonomous of reality and thought? The term is approached in two senses- the internal and the external. In the former sense the autonomous is one that is self - posited or constituted by rules. This position may culminate in interdependence of everything. In the later sense the term is used in the ontic sense of being independent of reality and thought. That which is autonomous does not depend for its existence upon thought and reality. In view of multiple function of language, cognitive and non-cognitive, we find a divided autonomy that is language is autonomous when it involves in non-cognitive function like interjection and is non-autonomous when it involves in the cognitive function of reference. Conclusively, a divided autonomy cannot be autonomy philosophically because rationalization of it culminates in a criterion applicable to assess the autonomy of language in its all uses cognitive and non-cognitive. Against the latter sense, it can be said that as any reflection, explanation, etc., of language presupposes language, any explanation of it in terms of something outside it is impossible, and hence autonomy of language. Against this Wittgensteinian view, it is objected that a reference needs to be revealed so for its own knowledge as reference first and then the knowledge of its meaning as well and this revelation presupposes relation between the two. Autonomy in the sense of independence of the reference from thought and reality is also questionable because in that case the reading, writing, translation and analyzing will not then be a cognitive activity. Language cannot be independent and separate from thought; it is thought itself.

According to representationists and essentialists of the west, the language is representation and reference respectively relative to the thing represented or referent. It may be said that language is

autonomous in the sense that it may be used for any or for different referents. Here it will be difficult to decide as to which one is autonomous- the reference or the referent. The difference between the reference and its referent cannot be overlooked. The former is a linguistic unit and the latter is exterior entity to be referred empirically. How can the two be related? For Wittgenstein the two are experiences and hence facts. All experiences for him are facts. Commonness of the facts, as he thinks, is the relation between them but this commonness is also an experience and hence a fact and this way it will not act as relation but will be a fact that is an addition to the heap of the facts. In this position there will be a case of relation being a relata. How can relation be a relata at the same time? If the relation between the two is not fixed that is if reference can be used for any referent then constitution of rules of grammar, translation and analysis of the referent through reference and ultimately communication by language will not be possible. Relation between the reference and referent is required not only in connection to non-cognitive but also to cognitive uses of the language. A reference is capable of being used for several meanings but only for that reason it cannot be said autonomous because this statement itself implies the autonomy of the **user** and not the autonomy of material reference. Why not then we accept the autonomy of a referent of which it is a reference? The reference cannot be produced without incentive and that is caused by the knowledge expressed in the mind. This dependency for production of references goes against the autonomy of reference. These observations are sufficient to point out that the concept of autonomy of language needs afresh deliberation.

Some Western philosophers of language argue about the autonomy of language in the sense of authoritativeness or indispensability of language. It is a very interestingly significant point in favour of the autonomy of language, because there is involvement of language in dealing with linguistic and non-linguistic entities but the question is: how can we explain autonomy without getting rid of ontological commitment, infatuation with the entities and subordination of language to reality? How can we avoid the problem of dependence of language on referents? W.V. Quine tries to defend this point by accepting the diaphanous character of language. According to him language by its nature is tending towards abstracting itself from reality or what is concrete and particular. Otherwise, language would fail in its essential purpose- to say what is not said so far with material already available- and this is possible only through the diaphanous nature of language. If this view of Quine is taken into consideration, it can be asked: does language have the competence of abstracting itself from the reality or is it done by mind that abstracts it from the reality? If language is itself abstraction, it cannot perform the task of abstracting itself from reality and, then, language will be a tool subordinated to mind for its function. Competence in the sense of multiple uses of language hardly adds anything to its autonomy. Competency in this sense points to the competency of the users and thus underestimates the autonomy of language. I shall take up this point in the course of discussion in ensuing paragraphs. The thesis discussed here in is based on a view that language is not just reference, designation or representation. It is expression. It can be used as reference and representation but it, in all the cases is the expresser of them. Language is autonomous not only in non-cognitive but in cognitive uses also because they and their differences are distinctly known so because they all are revealed so by language. Autonomy of Language discussed herein does not deny the qualities like, **independence, competence, authoritativeness, performance**, etc. they all are important factors for theorizing the autonomy of language. But the way they are discussed by the contemporary western philosophers of language raises a question- is

language confined to be a tool? How the autonomy of a tool is different from the autonomy of language? If the autonomy is taken with reference to its constituting rules and practicing those rules like the game of Wittgenstein that is constitutive of rules and is played as per those rules, it will not be different from interrelated rules and the subordination of the players to those rules. Then, where is room for freedom and independence of the player? Is autonomy of language non-different from an autonomous company or a business body? The language can be used in so many senses but only for that reason it cannot be called autonomous because it will depend then on the intention of the user and that will go in favour of autonomy of the user and against the autonomy of language.

Competence is an important point in the autonomy theory. It is taken by Wittgensteins in the sense of the use of language for several meanings and in different capacities. But here the user is privileged to be autonomous who uses it in different senses and the language occupies a status of only a tool that cannot cook itself. Autonomy of the language gets a proper place in the philosophy discussed here in because of accepting language as an expresser which if manifested by the tools expresses itself, its own nature first and its meaning is expressed non- differently by it. It expresses all sorts of intelligible –beings independently of existences outside. Language is competent in the sense that it is expresser, the thought that is of awareness nature; it is naturally fit to express all its meanings. I shall discuss the issue in subsequent paragraphs.

If we want to understand the philosophy of Language of any theorist we have to know determinately his views about the nature of language. If it is a reference or a representation, will naturally depend on a referent or a thing it represents and thus there will be either all or no scope for freedom and independence of language from the reality. Language, the signifier is autonomous because of expressing the signified non-differently. It reveals its own nature by itself without any dependency on sound/ marks/ signs and symbols. It has its own world of realities which are cognitive/intelligible beings. It is constant content of knowledge. External existences are not so important in cognition and explanation of the autonomy of language. Its autonomy rests on the functions it performs in cognitive activities. It is flash that reveals independently of ontic, psychic, religious and other Beings (with capital B) and our allegiances to them. It is independent of any constituted rules rather it serves as the basis of constituting rules of the knowledge expressed by the language that gives incentive and object for constituting rules and understanding them afterwards. Rules are also revealed and known thus because the language reveals them so. The rules of knowledge are basically the rules of language. Since the language infuses knowledge, isolated from language there is no possibility of knowledge.in case of the later hypothesis,language will be free and independent from thought and reality and thus it ,isolated from them will not function for their cognition.

Ubiquity is a primary factor in the autonomy of language. Communication is conveyance of a sense through the garbs from speakers to audience. Since language is the only revealer of sense and it is ubiquitous it causes incentive to speak and is communicated through articulations or marks to the audience. The listener's understanding of the sense communicated by the speaker is revealed through his perception of the articulation and thus the communication is possible only if ubiquity of

language is accepted. If ubiquity of language as concept or being is denied, there will be no possibility of cognition and communication by language.

Autonomy thesis accepts that our knowledge is not only based on but is confined to the intelligible beings and the intelligible beings are that which figure or are expressed by the language as concepts that, when manifested by the garb, flashes forth the sense. The language is expresser; it expresses the beings non-differently and independently from physiological, psychological, religious entities and our allegiances to them. It serves as self-restrained guide in the matter of cognition; it is foundational in the determination of cognition and overall, it, without depending on anything else than itself, accomplishes communication. Its ubiquity and communicability by nature must be taken into account for autonomy theory of language. Had the language not been autonomous, communication, that is, accomplishment of cognition in between the speakers and audience would have not been possible. Had it not been constant content/object of awareness in nature, identical cognition in all occurrences and instances of garbs, its rendering in different garbs, analysis and other cognitive activities like reading, writing, speaking would not be logically possible. Reference changes from person to person and from community to community but the signifier, the content of different garbs, remains constant. The content may be imposed on different objects by some similarity or opposition and thus the use of language for multiple meanings becomes possible. Had the language as the constant content not been there as the cognitive base of those activities, there were no possibility of multiple uses. Conclusively, language is the light of consciousness by which all sorts of objects flash. These flashes of the concepts of signifiers and signifieds have natural function of their own in accomplishment of cognition and in cognitive activities that are understood by us in logical syntactical structure and semantic devices also.

### **Autonomy of Language and its relation with Cognition**

Language, for the present discussion, is not confined to the garbs or tokens we speak and listen. Verbal noises, articulate utterances, written marks, etc., stand by proxy for the expresser but they are only tools in the manifestation of the expresser that flashes forth by itself when manifested by those garbs and from which its meaning flashes non-differently. The language is the signifier, the expresser (vācaka) and the meaning is the signified or the expressed (vācya) and are non-different. The term 'language' in the present discussion is not confined to garbs. Taking communication in the sense of cognition by language and accomplishment of communication as the essential character of language in view, my use of the term 'language' stands for the signifier that comprises of the intelligible beings of language, the expresser and the expressed or meaning non-differently expressed by it and the 'garbs' or 'language-token' as well by which the former is manifested. Cognition of the signified, for us who are accustomed of knowing through garbs, cannot be accomplished if the garbs are not taken as the manifesters of the signifier. So far the cognition is concerned; even the garbs are also discretely known so in their different occurrences because of their constant signifier. Cognition is the cognition of the signifier and the signified non-differently expressed by the former. Both of them are thought -objects. Had the signifier been different from the signified, or had the two are not thought -objects or intelligible beings, there would have been no cause of incentive to express and no possibility of expressions as well. The objects of expressions are thought -objects or intelligible beings. In case of the objects separate from the thought objects, figuring of meaning in

different capacities will not be possible and in case of meaning as a transcendental signified that is transcendental to the signifier, the question of translating and analyzing the transcendental by the language will stand as insolvable problem. The acceptance of a transcendental signified is philosophically unnecessary metaphysical presumption which relegates from the nature of meaning as unit of awareness.

A controversy over the difference and non-difference of the signifier and the signified or the language and the thought forms a basis of proper philosophical discussion here in on the autonomy of language. The autonomy of language can properly be estimated only if language is intelligible being, foundational in expressing the beings of its own nature and that of its meaning non-differently and independently from the physiological, psychological, religious entities, ontic in nature, and our allegiances to them. These intelligible beings are the objects to which our cognition, philosophical reflections and investigations are not only based on but are confined to them also. The function of philosophy is to analyze and to interpret the intelligible beings or beings expressed in the mind with a purpose of getting clarity of thoughts and hence achieving wisdom and ultimately bliss.

The concept of relation of language and thought is approached by Indian and Western philosophers of language basically in two ways. First, they are different. Language is secondary and subordinate to thought that is primary for the representation of which the language is employed as tool. Those who accept language as reference accepts that it refers to a referent outside the reference. The two are not identical; a reference cannot be or cannot change into a referent. The former is cognitive and the latter is material, or more specifically, linguistic in nature; the latter stands by proxy for the former. Second, the thoughts and language are non-different. The language is expresser and the meaning is that which it expresses non-differently in the mind. Having a conceptual position, language not only expresses itself its own nature in cognition but expresses its meaning non-differently. It expresses itself as a being that serves as the object of knowledge in an analysis of language. This non-difference of the expresser/signifier and expressed/signified forms the basis of autonomy theory of language. Isolated from language no thought, no cognition is possible because of the fact that language infuses cognition. Negative, positive, contradictory, indescribable, empty-concepts are all known so because they figure thus in the mind by language. This view is favoured theory of Pāṇinian tradition of language and Grammar and culminates in the cognitive holistic philosophy based on the autonomy of language discussed herein.

Autonomy theory of language believes in the active theory of knowing and all knowing knows by and in language as a basic premise of a language philosophy that properly estimates the power of language in cognition and observes its implication very useful for understanding the truth of the beings of cognition by language. According to this theory language reveals itself first and meaning is revealed non-differently by the former. No knowledge is possible if it is not expressed and the language is the only expresser in the autonomy theory of language. In the systems that believe cognition by perception, inference and other sources of knowledge in which the senses and other sources serve either as *kāraka* (expresser), as in the case of sense perception of a thing or as *jñāpaka* (indicator), as in the case of inference of fire for which the smoke serves as the indicator, of the cognition), the sources stand at a distance from the knowledge and are separated after perception/inference. The senses perceive the things when they come in contact; they need not be

cognized beforehand and that they are separated from those things after performing their vocation but this is not the case with cognition by language that reveals itself first in cognition and expresses its meaning non-differently.

### **Critique of Ontological Holism of Śankara**

Despite the truth that Bhartṛhari is a language philosopher (śābdika) for whom language is the guide and what the language expresses/ reveals is the authority in the matter of knowledge, his philosophy, in the past, has been evaluated by scholars as a metaphysics based on language principle i.e., śabdadvaitavāda, śabdabrahmavāda, sphaṭabrahmavāda and even in evaluating so the scholars have been found seriously trapped in the allegiances to the metaphysical non-dualism of Śankarācārya born at least four hundred years later to him but a very popular philosopher in India and abroad. Śankara's Advaitism, in one line, is a philosophy of Brhman, the non-dual absolute, the individual is the same reality and the phenomenal world being neither real nor unreal neither both nor none, is a false appearance.

Śankara's inquiry in to the truth is a transcendental method. In the process of approaching the reality of objects of perception in awaking state, he shows transcendence from the objects of waking to dream sleep and from sense-perceptions to expressions of self in dream. Physiological duality is transcended in sleep and all the metaphysical and epistemological duality, universal and individual, are transcended at a stage where there is transcendence from all experiences (Deep sleep). The reality realized by the sense of non-differences is the whole without a part and, therefore, he by declaring that the part or duality is ignorance affirms the non dual reality of Brahman (Sarvamkhalvidam Brahman) which is the eternal Truth (sat). In the spiritualism of Śankara that which can be transcended is not the real and the real is never transcended. It is beyond the logical categories of duality and contradictoriness. Epistemologically, the objects of imagination, hallucinations, doubts etc., are transcended by sense perception the objects of which are transcended by inference and again the objects of all the different sources of knowledge are transcended by authority which is also transcended by realization of the truth that is pure consciousness (Citta) by nature. The enjoyment of worldly phenomena in waking, dreaming and sleep is sometimes pleasant and another times painful. Pain is transcended by pleasure and again the reign of both of the pleasure and pain are transcended in the Trans of the transcendent that for Śankara is bliss (Ānanda). Through the transcendence process, Śankara philosophizes that the non-dual Reality is acknowledged metaphysically as eternal Truth different from falsity. Epistemologically, as conscious principle different from material things to be known by different sources of knowledge and axiologically and aesthetically, as bliss different from the worldly pleasure and pain. It is clear from the aforementioned picture that the discussion taken up by Śankara in his Commentaries of Brahmasūtra and Upaniṣads is Religious and meant for Sādhanā of moving to a spiritual state from the philosophical.

The theory discussed herein believes in the reality of knowledge expressed by language to which philosophical reflections are confined. I do not deny the Reality of the things-in themselves that is world in which we live in and with which we do and the reality of spirit, the śabda Brahman, the highest goal for spiritual aspirants (sādhaka). Uniqueness of the present thesis lies in defining the world of philosophical reflections and investigations to the world of intelligible beings that figure in

the mind through language. The world in-itself is all important for practice, perception and habits or for religious concern. For a philosopher of language for whose estimation language is a conscious force having autonomy to reveal itself and its meaning, philosophy is a reflective system and as such confined to the intelligible objects only. Thing-in-itself, that is the Brahman, the soul, the table, the chair and the whole entities ontic in nature are known by presumption as the ontic substratum of the knowledge revealed by language in the mind. Even 'mind in itself' is not a direct concern of philosophy because the language philosopher has a concern only with the reflection on the cognition expressed in the mind by the language 'mind'. Śabda Brahman of which worldly process results in six specific forms (birth, existence, growth, alteration, decomposition and decay) is the only reality. It is understood in two ways 1. As the external things we perceive and 2. As the intelligible beings figured in the mind by language, of which the former belongs to the world of doing with and the latter to the knowing with which philosophers are concerned. Both of the worlds are real; the former is metaphysically real while the latter is philosophically real; the former is a concern of religion and practice while the other is a concern of philosophy. Śabdabrahman as ontic reality is not a being because a being is either universal or individual. It is conscious principle and metaphysically it is transcendental to all the universals and the individuals and is highly significant for religious sādhanas.

The six modifications of Śabda Brahman in the world of matter and mind is understood metaphysically in terms of kriyā -vivarta and mūrti -vivarta that is limited by time and space. The two are non- different. Same thing from the point of view of space (deśa) of an accomplished character is called 'mūrti' and from the point of view of time or sequence (time) standing for action or process that is of non-finished character is called by the term 'Kriyā' and the two are the specific forms known as figured so by language in distance and duration respectively. Time is action. There is no action which is not done in a time and in a space and the figuring of a space is a figuring in a time and the figuring in a time is a figuring of a form (space) and that is why grammarians and philosophers accept the meaning of a word in a scheme of analysis as a composite of agent, action, person, number, gender, means, mood etc. The language principle, ontically, is the consciousness, the principle expressed in the realm of spatio-temporal things (Being) and is the language, the revealer of the objects of cognition (being with small 'b') as well out of which the latter is a being directly revealed and the former is known by the imposition/inference of the objects of cognition expressed in the mind by language, as the ontic substratum of the latter. Events of finished and unfinished characters in the world of experience are known as the ontic substratum of the beings that is the objects of cognition by the imposition of the latter which is only revealed by language.

I do not deny or overlook the thing-in-itself. It does not feel any philosophical need to form a metaphysical system or to support some or the other kind of metaphysics. I use the term 'metaphysical entity, metaphysical thing or metaphysical reality' remotely for the things in - themselves without a distinction of them as perceived empirical entities or they beyond the touch of mind. Overall, anything that figures in the mind by language is intelligible being and that which does not figure because of the limitation of mind or because of them being transcendental to the reality expressed by language in cognition is metaphysical or ontic Being. It has no intention to deny or to refute Beings whether transcendental or empirical. It accepts only those beings (with small 'b' in contrast with the primary Being with Capital 'B' that is the thing -in itself- empirical and

transcendental) which figure in the mind by language and that the language and the meaning revealed non-differently in the mind are only such beings which are intelligible or philosophical beings to which our philosophical reflections, investigations are not only based on but are confined to also. Why intelligible beings are designated philosophical being in the discussion throughout the book? The simple reply is: I understand that all concepts or ideas are beings (with small 'b') of awareness in nature and these beings only figure by language. Since these beings are object of philosophical reflections, analysis, translation and all sorts of cognitive activities I, therefore, use the term 'philosophic -being' for them. These beings can only be analyzed, reflected on for knowledge and clarity. All problems are problems at the conceptual level or thought level and these can be clarified by no other means than by philosophical reflection. Metaphysical entities are known by implication as the ontic substratum (tāttvika samānādhikaraṇa) of the objects figured in knowledge and of the beings expressed by language that serve as the foundation of implication, inference etc., also. Here, the term 'knowledge by language' stands for the knowledge of the intelligible objects which are philosophic beings that is expressed by language. They are only intelligible beings the mind can know. These beings are intelligible because they are beings of awareness in nature and the mind can know only the beings figured in. They are philosophic beings because these beings are the only objects to which philosophers can reflect.

### **Understanding Objects of Cognition in Autonomy Thesis**

Here, I clarify the point that the language, we use to communicate, is not confined to the articulate utterances (dhvaniyān) or to gestures, symbols, signs and marks we write (lipiyān) by proxy for those utterances. They are language token or garbs which we learn from our observation of the uses by elders in a language speaking community. They serve as tool by which the indivisible language of the awareness in nature is manifested. Being manifested through the garbs, the signifier that is the indivisible flash of awareness for which grammarians use the word sphoṭa is revealed. My use of the term 'garb' comprises of all those phenomena for instance -verbal articulation we speak and hear, written marks we read, gestures, signs and symbols and all those that help manifestation of the Sphoṭa which being manifested by them flashes forth its own nature from which its meaning flashes forth non-differently. Sense perception, sense-data acquired by perception or inference, etc., are also included in my use of the term because all these phenomena are tools or instrumental only in the manifestation of the sphoṭa and knowledge is always revealed by that only. As knowledge in ordinary communication is not possible without the garbs we speak or write, these tools by proxy are also called language. The language comprises of the garbs through which we communicate and the language, the signifier that is communicated.

The use of the term 'language' cannot be equated with the set of sentence or sentences made of spoken or written words made out of association of letters in a sequence or with the letters themselves or an aggregate of all of them. A cognitive holist observes language from the point of view of cognition of a complete sense or a unit meaning. If a complete sense is expressed even by articulation of a letter or by a word that is indivisible unit or sentence and if a complete sense is not expressed even by a number of sets of sentential-garbs, they do not serve as a complete unit of language.



The expresser because of conventional proximity is manifested through garbs only. The term 'communication' stands for accomplishment of cognition expressed by language. The language and the garbs stroke in a way that from the view of a speaker the former causes incentive for the production and articulation of the verbal noises and from the view of audience or listeners the latter manifests the former for revelation.

As per my observation, to frame a theory of metaphysics is not primary or even secondary aim of philosophical reflections and the expressions about ontic entities are only explanatory praise sentences (arthavāda) meant for prompting a reader to keep the interest ahead while going through the analysis of subtle problems of cognition and cognitive beings that is the language and the meaning. Secondly, the metaphysical entities, in some cases serve as the ontic substratum of the intelligible beings for helping the understanding of those who seek an ontic base of cognitive/revealed beings and finally the mention of thing-in-itself as the ontic substratum of revealed beings is not contradictory, rather, supports the exposition of the view based on cognition and, thus, they are relevant for those who are disinterested in moving forwards without seeking a metaphysical basis of cognitive beings.

### **Understanding Language**

There are two sorts of understanding about language popular in Western and Indian traditions. They are - i. Metaphysical understanding of language and ii. Cognitive understanding of language. In the former, language is analyzed by taking it as a reference, representation, designation of the things which the theorists construct as referent, represented object or designata, logical or practical, the world of experience. It takes thoughts and reality different from language. Language is learnt conventionally as that which stands for the entities in the experience and comes forward to represent the thoughts. Essentialists and Representationists of the west, Indian philosophical heterodox and orthodox systems for whom the two are separate entities of which the former is primary, accept that language refers to or represents the objects in the empirical world. Verifiability is the criterion of the meaningfulness of the language. So far thoughts are concerned, how can the thought be meaningful? Is verifiability of thought necessarily the verifiability of language as well? If it is yes, then one has to accept the two as non-different and then has to accept that the law of any of the two is the law governing the both –the language and the thought. What, then, will be the sense of saying that the language is the reference or representation as the case may be and the thought is the referendum or represented? By what means or character the linguistic, mental and ontic units are related? Is language not a thought in a cognitive activity like analysis and reflection on language and meaning? To deny it as thought is to deny the determinate nature of knowledge on one hand and philosophy as self conscious reflection or a cognitive activity par excellence on the other hand. Knowledge is always a determinate knowledge and this determination is not possible without language. Is analysis of language necessarily an analysis of thought? If it is not, then no analysis, no translation of thought that is a transcendental signified will be possible on one hand and the analysis and translation of the language will not then necessarily be the analysis and the translation of the thought on the other hand. If it is yes, how can the non-difference of the two be denied? Language and thoughts are cognitive units that is of awareness by nature.

The language in Indian tradition is –remotely the garbs that we articulate and is the object of perception; cognitively, it is the thought or the intelligible beings that are directly revealed. The conscious self is known by implication as the ontic substratum of the knowledge of thoughts and lastly it is called Brahman. Language for philosophical purposes comprises the earlier two while the latter two are the object of religion (sādhanā). Being power or energy it transforms into divergent worldly things, thoughts and languages that, when used in a referential capacity, refer to or represent to them. ‘The crow sitting on the roof of Deodatta’s house’ is a reference by which his house is referred to. The relation between the crow and his house is that of pointer and pointed but the house is reached by afterwards efforts of knowing for which the reference is made and is separated latter likewise the language, in the metaphysical understanding, is the reference and the things it refers are referents and the truth lying beyond what we refer is the intelligible being. Confining to this metaphysical understanding of language, it is said that all words point to the śabda -Brahman indirectly and to things or referents directly. This implies that language is metaphorical and the things it refers to are Primary Beings. Well, it cannot be denied that language performs several functions including referring and representing. Only by limiting myself to these activities of language, the real value and the autonomy of the language are not only underestimated properly because it, in that way, stands only as referring tool. It stands like labels of commodities as we find in the theory of representationists. In this way of understanding language, it’s foundational character of revealer and revealed or expresser and expressed is overlooked and consequently all verbal cognition turn to a metaphorical descriptions. If religion is primary in a system, the cognitive enterprise falls as of only a secondary phenomenon committed and subordinated to the former but that is of no philosophical significance. Philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence because of it being a reflection on the cognition infused by language and the objects of cognition being intelligible or philosophical are not the transcendental signified / religious Beings.

### **Nature of Signifier and the Autonomy Thesis: A reply to J. Derrida**

Autonomy thesis assumes that language infuses thought, the two are intertwined. It considers consciousness as given thoughts or as concepts which becomes the object of philosophical reflections and analysis when flashes forth. Thoughts are always determinate. A thought is a thought because of being determinately known thus and this determination is not possible if isolated from the language that infuses them. Both - thought and language are governed by the same law because the language is non-different from the thought .It is the autonomy of the language that it reveals itself and its meaning without depending on anything else other than language itself. In ordinary communication the use of articulations and marks is helping tools in the manifestation of the language. Neither the tools nor the manifestation of the language are sufficient factors for the cognition of expression and its meaning. It reveals its own nature first from which its meaning is revealed non-differently. Syntactical and semantic rules are framed in order to understand the cognition of language as it figures and that which it reveals serves as the cognitive ground of the rule-scheme understanding and framing of rules and, therefore, authoritative ground of those logical activities also.

Let philosophy succeed for clarity against confusion and wisdom against ignorance. Philosophical reflections are not only based on but are confined to the philosophical beings also. Autonomy

theory of language does not accept the concept of a transcendental signified; a concept is always an intelligible being. Transcendental signified is accepted by the theorists who want to seek a constant content far beyond from the objects of cognition or beings which for them are transient. According to the theorist, without a transcendental signified there will be no content that lasts till it is analyzed or translated and thus, they think that analysis and translation of cognition will not be possible if a transcendental signified is not accepted as a constant content of those activities. Transcendental signified is different from the signifier and the theorists themselves accept the signified different from the signifier. However, they do not deny that analysis and translation of the signified is made possible only through the signifier that is only available at hand.

The theory under discussion explains the problem of analysis and translation by taking the latter as the constant content that is given but flashes forth when manifested by garbs. It is not reduced or destroyed by those flashings. It is of awareness by nature and is communicable. It is communicated through garbs we learn from a community. With the difference of community the garbs differ but the language, the signifier remains constant; it flashes forth in the mind whenever manifested by token and is communicated through those token whenever there is an expectancy to communicate. It is analyzed and translated because the content is awareness and only the awareness has the capacity to be expressed through a particular garb or is presentable in differing garbs also. The knowledge is distinct in each of its instances and occurrences but the content of the knowledge may be the same in its translation in different garbs. It is because of this fact that the analysis and the translation become possible and that these activities are taken as philosophical activities. Not only that but being a constant content the object of that cognition, figures also in its different instances and occurrences. If otherwise, translation and analysis will not only be a philosophical activity but these activities will not be possible also. For autonomy thesis language itself is the constant content from which meaning is revealed. It is not transcendental but revealed and the signifier and the signified are only such beings as are revealed.

I share with Derrida who philosophies that any attempt to search meaning different from the text is misleading; meaning is always the meaning of the text. He tries to show impossibility of the translation of a text in view of realist's logic according to which 'the content of a text that is the object of verbal cognition is a transcendental signified and the contents of the translations of the text are the copies of the transcendental signified or the transcendental signified as appeared to the mind of the translators. With the difference of translator's capacity of mind and receptivity of the text, the content of translations also differs. For the theory discussed here in, identical cognition revealed by the text in all its readings is accomplished in all occurrences because of the text being a constant content that serves as the criterion of a right translation in different garbs. If the text is not expressed or expressed otherwise when it is put in a different garb, the translation is taken as bad. I have already discussed that the content of the cognition and the cognition are different in so far otherness is a quality of the content only.

It is right to say that the signifier, in the autonomy theory, is not different from the signified and hence there may be cases of a signifier being taken for a signified; that is, a signifier from the sense of intelligible object is a signified as well. It can be asked that a signifier cannot be a signified at the same time. When an object figures by language as a signifier, it is known so and when it is

presented by language as a signified; it is known as signified and not as a signifier. The flash in the mind being intelligible object can be conceived as both the signifier and the signified non-differently expressed by the former. Thus, the Derridian arguments for refuting a text because it is transcendental, impossibility of translation and the confusing of signifier for a signified are not applicable to the autonomy theory discussed here in because of them as intelligible beings.

### **Response to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's arguments against infusion thesis of cognition:**

It can be said that the thesis 'cognition infused by language' cannot be proved. In their opinion, the language is tool in the indication of the meaning and the cognition of meaning as well. As an indicator stands always at a distance from what it indicates and is separated after performing the act of indicating, the indicator (siddha) and the indicated (sādhya) cannot be intertwined. Is it proper to say that the senses (eyes, etc.) which are means for accomplishment of the cognition of the object and the object (pot, etc.) cognized through them are infused together? It can also be added, from the side of those who take language only as means of cognition, that the language, for example, the word 'pot', the meaning 'pot' and the cognition 'pot' are indicated by the speaker by the same word 'pot' because there is no other instrument or means except language for indication of them. Nonetheless, it, as they say, is only by the limitation of the speaker that he uses the same word 'pot' as an indication to all of them and this limitation of the speaker cannot be taken as a ground for accepting cognition infused with language. They may add that the theory of "language infuses cognition," that is the infusion of means and ends is inconsistent because it is not, as such to be proved by any means. There is no infusion of senses (means of perception) and the object (pot, etc.) perceived by them. On the basis of this reasoning they conclude that theory of cognitive/sentence-holism based on the infusion of cognition and language is ignorance.

It can be said that the above objections raised by the opponents, particularly, by the systems of Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, are based on their overlooking the difference between perception and cognition. It is, as we have seen in the earlier pages, distinctive feature of cognition by language that it, unlike the senses, plays a different role. It is the very nature of language that it reveals itself before, it reveals meaning. As nature cannot change and as it is based on cognition or comprehension, one is bound to accept that which is cognized directly; if, otherwise, there would be a case of violation of the cognition and communication. Cognition, as such, is discriminative by nature and discrimination is not possible without language. How can the sense of 'pot' be distinguished from that of 'cot' if cognition of them is not infused by language? Even "the sense datum" of 'pot' if separated from the language cannot be known because it will not then be the object of cognition. The cognition 'the pot is there' acquired either by perception or by inference cannot distinctly be understood so isolated from language.

Objecting to autonomy position, it can be argued that in between the two types of perceptual cognition, that is, determinate (savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka), the former would not and the latter could not be taken as infused with language. The indeterminate perception, as they say, is cognition void of the association of language (śabdāsānsarga śūnya) and that there is only association (and not infusion) of language in a determinate perception. It is contradictory to accept cognition as infused with language on one hand and to refute the existence of indeterminate cognition on the other hand. If the two (determinate and indeterminate cognition) are infused with language, how will the two be differentiated? The objections raised above are based on a wrong idea that language is confined to verbal utterances/noises only. In reply to the objections raised above, it can be said that all objects of

cognition are cognized as objects revealed by language. Autonomy theory of language views cognition as essentially and cognitively infused with language. Can the objects be expressed and known separately from the language, the expresser? No, they all are revealed by language.

Incentives to do or not to do something are not possible without cognition and no cognition is possible if isolated from language. Cognition, if taken for a moment as isolated from language, will be unknown and impossible. Even the cognition, indeterminate or that in a newborn baby is also intertwined with language. The activities like crying, tittering, sucking, vibrating of the vocal organs, etc. of it cannot be accomplished if there is no incentive, and, as the incentive to act or not to act or something other to act cannot be denied, cognition as the cause of those incentives must be accepted. Those who take language as confined to these tokens learnt gradually after birth fail to understand the nature of cognition and deny even the fact of cognition in the newly born baby. Nothing but given speech-dispositionality of its consciousness can only be accepted as the revealer of the cognition that causes incentive in a baby. There is no other means by which it can acquire knowledge. Its audio-video organs are not matured enough to be taught or even to grasp from outside. It is given since its birth and that is the reason it tries naturally to communicate by crying, etc. and gradually learns to communicate with little effort; if, otherwise, it would not be possible for it to make efforts for learning to communicate. Thus, the cognition of the baby who is completely unaware of language-meaning relation is infused with language. Similar is the case with the cognition in the dumb and deaf who communicate through their bodily gestures and by the gestures by the audience, the signifier flashes forth to them non-differently.

Putting the ground for differentiating the determinate from indeterminate cognition, it can be asked that infusion of thought with language or otherwise is not the ground for their difference because all cognition is infused with language. In the case of determinate cognition, the expresser (vācaka) is fully revealed and its meaning (vācya) is distinctly cognized, Contrary to it, in cases of indeterminate cognition, the expresser is not fully revealed and in the state of non-apprehension or misapprehension of the expresser in its completeness and distinction, its meaning with all its distinctive characteristics is not revealed or is revealed otherwise.

It is the language on account of which the inferential cognition is distinctively known so. Dream-objects and that of deep-sleep are distinctly known as they are also revealed by language. Nothing can be expressed isolated from language.

### **Can Proposition be Autonomous? A statement about autonomy of sentence:**

I use sentence for the Sanskrit term 'vākya' and take it as indivisible unit of awareness in nature. For my approach it is different from that of the Western holism according to which language is constituted of words like a nominal, expressive of an agent, a verb, expressive of action and an accusative, expressive of an object to be achieved by the action. It, for them, is utterances in a sequence or set of marks written in so many inches long. The Westerners make a distinction between sentence and proposition. A proposition is an abstraction, abstracted from a sentence perceived in different instances and occurrences but it in the present theory is neither a construction out of association of different words nor an abstraction from the garb of sentence that helps only in manifestation of it. Sentence is an indivisible being which is explained through analytic device based on the garb of sentence as a construction useful for its understanding in a

syntactical scheme of analysis as a formation by association of the words - substantives, verbs, accusative words, prepositions, roots and suffixes and hence different from the sentence as a cognitive unit. There may be fraction of the unit in the analytic scheme but a unit is always that indivisible which expresses a complete sense. By a complete sense, I mean the unit that flashes forth by language and by which further expectancy in the accomplishment of a unit sense is satiated. If it is not revealed in the mind, no cognition, no cause of incentive of the articulation and no communication by language will be possible. Even the proposition in order to be known so requires to be known thus first and thus, the expresser of knowledge is foundational even in accepting a proposition as abstracted.

Propositionists of the West accept proposition as abstracted fact-abstracted from several instances and occurrences of sentences (sentential garb) signifying the same proposition. Opposite to them, a sentence (indivisible, meaning-revealing unit of awareness in nature) is not an abstraction from occurrences and instances perceived. It is unrevealed given and flashes forth as awareness of itself and of meaning. Garbs are tools only in manifestation of the given unit, that is, sentence that reveals itself when manifested by the former. In the two fold interpretation of sentence as a synthesis of words in an analytic scheme and it as indivisible awareness the former is outcome of analysis and the latter is original that is analyzed artificially. The latter is neither an abstraction from outside nor mental construction in its popular use of the term but is awareness that reveals both itself and the meaning. The signifier ceases to be so, will lose its expressive character (vācakatva), if taken as abstracted. Even thought, if accepted as an abstracted unit (if accepted for a moment) also implies it in order to be revealed, otherwise, how could it be known so? In a reflective system, language itself is thought. If thought is abstracted from language, it cannot reveal itself and the meaning also, and, then, no knowledge will be accomplished and no abstraction will be possible. The idea of abstraction may lead to undesirable metaphysical presumption of the things from which it is abstracted, the mind which abstracts and the relation of them as well. An abstracted proposition may be taken as that signified by sentences but how can it signify meaning if it does not signify itself first as a signifier and hence, the idea of proposition as abstraction is, cognitively and logically, inconsistent. Contrary to it, the language is not a unit abstracted from garbs but an autonomous being. The idea of language as autonomous being that acts on for expressing thoughts of itself and of its meaning by nature inevitably implies the non-difference of language and thought.

The non-difference of language and meaning may not be acceptable to those who take that the law of language and that of thought are different. The former is a law formulated by men for operating the tools for a community while the latter is the law that governs the human mind. In order to accommodate the two, some philosophers construct the logical facts. They confine the facts to experiences that have no existence without their knowledge. The understanding of knowledge and its laws can be feasible only when autonomy of language is accepted.

While Western and Indian schools of philosophy other than Pāṇinian tradition take only meaning as thought and make a difference between the two by taking language only as a referring tool, autonomy thesis estimates it thought/concept. If language and thought are different, it will be contradictory to accept philosophy as a system of analysis of language for clarification of thought. The analysis of language (separate from thought) will not then be the analysis of thought, and hence, it will be an

aimless intellectual game. How can the clarification of the latter by analysis of the former be achieved, if they are different? Not only philosophy but analysis will also be a useless task if language and thought are taken as separate. It is rather contradictory to assume language and thought as different on one hand and to accept analysis of language as the basis of clarification of thought on the other hand. This difficulty is equally applicable to all those philosophies which take language as confined to language-token and also to those who take language as abstracted from verbal utterances. For me the same idea from the point of view of expresser is language and from the point of view of expressed is the meaning (signified, thought-object) and the expression comprises the two- the signifier and the signified in a unity. Both of them are retained by the same law – the law of cognition for which the language is the expresser and the expressed, the law of non-difference of language and cognition, that is, cognition as revealed and infused by language. The idea of infusion of language and thought serves as the basic ground of philosophy of sentence-holism. Both of the language and meaning figure as object in a cognition. A proposition as an outcome of abstraction can be autonomous neither for its own existence nor for its function because it will depend on instances and occurrences of a sentence for the former and will require a cognitive or even an ontic base for linking itself with the thought and the reality.

Conclusively, we can say that philosophy, for the preferred theory, does not have room for copy-theory of cognition as it conceives language not merely as a designation/representation but as an expression. The language does not infuse thought only but it is thought itself also and for that reason it is foundational. Its autonomy lies in revealing itself its own nature independently of any exterior factor and it being non-different from the meaning it reveals. Representative theory of cognition is inconsistent with the distinctive nature of cognition itself and underestimates the power of language as expresser. To accept its dependency on thought and reality of which it is representation.

The ubiquity and revealed character of the expresser on one hand and its communicability or sharability on the other hand are essential features of autonomy of language because of which it performs cognitive activities independently. Had it not been revealed, there would be nothing to serve as the cause of incentive to speak or to produce articulate utterance or garbs as well. In brief, the ubiquity, the indivisibility, the expressiveness and non-difference of language and thought form the basis of the autonomy theory of language.

### **Autonomy of Language, the intelligible being:**

What is the meaningful linguistic unit? It is question always raised by those scholars who take sentence as the signifier. Is a word not a signifier? The way the question is raised indicates that taking language as reference scholars try to understand a word as a signifier. So far signifier is concerned, not only sentences but words even the roots and suffixes are also signifiers because they in a philosophical reflection are concepts. Signifier is that which reveals itself and its meaning as well and can be syntactically and semantically interpreted without going into any change in its nature. The significant question that can be asked is concerned with unit of language and that is specifically based on cognition of a complete meaning. A complete meaning is that by knowing which further expectancy regarding completion of a unit sense is satiated. A complete meaning is the sentential meaning which is expressed by a sentence. If a complete sense is expressed only by the utterance of a word or of a letter even, they are also complete units of language. Nonetheless,

the word in the analytical scheme is taken as expressive of universal by which the expectancy for the completion of a sense is not satiated. They are not complete units if they express universal because the expectancy for a complete sense is not satiated by universal as signified. It can be denied as a complete unit if cognition of sentential nature is not expressed by it. In that case, the denial of it as the revealer of a complete sense will be a denial of human knowledge.

Since all knowledge is knowledge infused by language, the knowledge expressed by the language is determinate. All knowledge is veridical as it is revealed by language. Not only that but the demand of any further epistemic justification or evidence and instance for justifying the philosophical need, for convincing, accepting or denying the cognition expressed in the mind by language will not stand significantly, if the veridical cognition expressed by language in the mind is not there as the cognitive base of those activities. The cognition revealed by language is the veridical knowledge that stands as the cognitive base of logical and epistemological investigations and justification as well and that is, perhaps, the reason the theory do not feel any need to discuss epistemological problems separately for proving the objectivity of the knowledge expressed. Not only that but isolated from language no philosophical reflection, no analysis, no explanation and no clarification and overall no cognition is possible. If language and thought are taken as separated like reference and referent or representation and what is represented then the analysis of language will not be the analysis of knowledge and vice versa. There will not be the possibility of translation. Reading, writing, speaking and understanding will not be cognitive activities if the thesis 'language infuses cognition' is denied.

An autonomist's position is like that of a cognitive holist for whom the sentence and the sentential meaning expressed by the former are indivisible flashes that are made understandable to the beginners through two fold analysis namely grammatical and philosophical. Grammatically, a sentence is divided into words comprising nominatives, verbs, prefixes, particles and post-positions and words are divided into roots/stems, their respective suffixes and letters and accordingly their very general meanings are decided philosophically as universal, individual, universal qualified by individual and so on so forth. A word derived by the analysis of sentence is also taken as a unit and then universal, individual, gender, number, means are analysed as its meaning. Universal, individual, agent, time, number, person and mood are decided as the meaning of the verbs. The meaning of suffixes, prefixes etc., are decided as suggestive and expressive in some cases.

Different theories interpret the understanding of a sentential meaning differently. Sentential - meaning as the meaning conveyed by the association of word meanings (sansargārtha), it as the connected denotation conveyed by a word (sansrṣṭārtha), it as the purpose indicated by use of words in a sentential set (prayojanārtha), it as the action (kriyārtha), contextual and other possible theories of meaning are different interpretations of the indivisible sentential meaning and only in that sense they are useful and relevant theories of verbal -cognition. Some are relevant from the point of view of learners' understanding and others are relevant from the point of view of interpretation but the indivisible flash works in the bottom line as the cognitive ground of those interpretations. The preferred theory, analyses, critically observes and evaluates those theories so as to find out how far they are successful in reaching the understanding of the concepts as they figure in communication.



Language is autonomous as it reveals all sorts of intelligible beings. It from the point of view of communicability is the language that is, expresser and from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition is expressed. The being for the theory is qualified universal in case of sentential meaning because of which identical cognition in different occurrences and instances is accomplished and is universal in case of word meanings. As the theory accepts 'universals in the universal' there is no logical difficulty in accepting the universals inhering in the universals and individuals as well. The cognition of an object like pot', etc., for the preferred theory, is also universal but cognition itself is not universal. If it is universal it will be an object of cognition but cognition, as we have indicated earlier, is not as object or another in cognition. Though cognition of the objects like language and meaning is taken as an object of philosophical reflection, it is not itself an object in that cognition. There is a difference between the idea of cognition and the cognition itself. The idea of cognition is the object/ being of cognition and of philosophical reflections but cognition in-itself does not figure or is not cognized as an object or another in that cognition. It is itself awareness and, hence, foundational. It is contradictory to accept the cognition simultaneously as object of its own.

The autonomy theory of the language paves the way for interpretation of the problem of identical cognition by words and sentences themselves. What is the cause of identical cognition? Philosophers, of the East and the West, have discussed the problem of identical cognition by taking it as cognition of group (samūha), similarity (sādṛśya) and the capability of the individual (sāmarthya) but a cognitive holist interprets the problem on the basis of language and meaning as universal (jāti). The issue is discussed in great detail in the chapter 'How and what we know by a word'.

The interpretation of universal is highly significant in understanding the philosophy according to which the words, their meanings are universal and the sentence and the sentential meaning are units universal in being revealing identical cognition in all their occurrences and instances. One can make a difference between the former universal and the latter by the specific activity performed by the latter. However, the problem of identical cognition by both of the units is explained on the basis of them being universal that is very general universal in case of words and qualified universal in case of sentence respectively.

Autonomy thesis makes a distinction between the knowledge of the objects and the knowledge itself. As per my reading, the word 'knowledge' denotes the object, that is universal but the knowledge itself is not an object. 'Otherness' is the character of objects of cognition but there is no otherness of cognition of the objects of cognition. It is self contradictory to say that cognition is an object or another in that cognition or in a new cognition. Knowledge is awareness of the object and the self awareness itself. The self awareness is foundational to all cognition of the objects that are relational to the knowledge. Anuvyavasāya of Naiyāyikas' is mistaken as cognition of the cognition but, in fact, it is cognition of the objects. Knowledge is not an object in a recognition or even in a memory in which only the object of cognition figures. This distinction of 'knowledge' and 'the object in that knowledge' is highly a major point that not only distinguishes the present theory from other theorist's who confuse the two but also provides importance to all reflective enterprise as an outcome of the analytic treatment of knowledge that is indivisible and can be made understandable only through the analytic scheme. The object of knowledge is a constant content that may be the

object of other cognition and that serves as the constant content of translations in different garbs, analysis and interpretation of the object but the knowledge itself is not a content. Philosophers reflect and analyses the content of knowledge as it figures in the mind but the knowledge itself is new in each case.

In autonomy theory of language, the signifier is competent enough to express meaning by itself. For this capability of signifier, Bhartṛhari uses the term 'Yogyatā that can be understood by the instance of the natural fitness of the senses. The fitness of eyes to perceive form and colour is eternal. That is why only eyes and not other senses are naturally fit to perceive form and color. A particular sense organ has no fitness for the cognition of objects to be perceived by other senses. Other senses namely, ear, tongue, nose and skin have their fitness in the cognition of the objects in which they are naturally fit and not in the objects of other senses. The power of those senses are not perceived apart from or isolated from the function they perform. As power is not perceived independently from the possessor (relata) and it is power that works for an effect, it is defined as eternally dependent and as it is to be found always in between the two it is defined as *dviṣṭa* that is to be found in between the two. In the context of verbal cognition which is understood as that caused by the relation of the language and meaning, the natural fitness of expressing itself and its meaning is relation. Only natural fitness of the signifier has the character of being eternally dependent<sup>13</sup>. It is the relation between the expresser and expressed (*dviṣṭa*). It is notable that case-relations, caused-cause, identity (*tādātmya*) etc., are not the relation in- themselves as they do not act on for relation in all the cases of the use of words or beyond their limit, for example, the identity relation is applicable only in the cases where difference is perceived first. Accusative case relation does not serve as relation in other case-relations and caused-cause relation does not do so for cases different from it. They function as power only within their limits and not in other cases. Ultimately, they are called thus because of their fitness to express their meanings. It is natural fitness of the language by which it expresses the expressed non-differently. It is called the relation by the virtue of its natural fitness only<sup>14</sup>. All sorts of meaning are related with the language because it is naturally fit to express all of them. Convention specifies or limits the relation (*yogyatā*) to a specific meaning by which a fixed meaning is popularly known by a fixed use.

It is due to natural fitness that the language not only reveals the being that exists but also that which does not exist. To be very precise, the idea of non-being figured in the mind by language is also a being that is intelligible or philosophic being. Like the idea of being, the ideas by the words such as non-being, non-existence, empty-concept (*alika*), past and future existences equally figure positively by language in the mind and that is why they are known so<sup>16</sup>. This view emphasizes not only the autonomy and freedom of Language in the knowledge of meaning but also presents a philosophical character of being and non-being to which the law of contradiction is not applicable. Verity of cognition, cognition by negative sentences—used independently of affirmative sentences—can be properly explained only by taking the reality of the being figured in by language independently of external existences and our allegiances to them. Relation is eternally there with the signifier as its fitness. Even if a word and its meaning are accepted as transient the relation as the eternal fitness of the word cannot be denied because a word is always a word as it expresses its meaning, may be positive, negative or empty -concepts which are known thus because the language expresses them so.

### **Autonomy thesis and the question of Verity and Validity:**

By the term "veridical cognition" we mean the cognition revealed or figured in by language and that which by itself functions as an incentive to an action. The clear and distinct cognition revealed by language is always a new and veridical cognition and that is why it is called by the term 'pratibhā'. Cognition (sentential and word-meaning) is veridical; it makes the possibility of its further observation, examination, etc., through reasoning and experience for men who seek verification or confirmation for believing in the verity of knowledge. Verification and confirmation of a veridical cognition revealed in the mind are the most central epistemological problem of philosophy for those who take language as that which stands by proxy for the things. They decide and accept the truth of cognition revealed by statement on the basis of the state of affairs, that is, 'A statement is true if it has a referent in the empirical world, otherwise, false'. Contrary to them, autonomy thesis of language observes no need for external objects for explaining communication, that is, the world of expressions. The verifying experience as a complete independent unit of experiential event has no connection whatsoever with the earlier experience which are supposed to verify and, thus, the testability theory of meaning based on the comparison of it with referable entities is of no use and of no significance as far as the accomplishment of communication or cognition by language is concerned.

Verity is the very character of the cognition accomplished in communication. No communication is possible if the cognition revealed by language is not veridical. Veridical cognition revealed in the mind is prior to, and functions as, a base of verification, falsification, confirmation, etc.; involved in explaining so. These are means required for convincing the persons governed by stereotyped perception and practice. Persons having stereotyped attitude regarding cognition consider language as name/designation/reference/representation of things or of action. The explanation of the veridical cognition revealed by language is useful for facilitating logical understanding of man who tries to fit his understanding in logical syntax and semantics. Such an understanding inevitably demands verification of a statement based on reason and experience for believing.

Verification is a logical criterion applied for the examination of a statement on the basis of referents as meaningful or meaningless or even as true or otherwise. It has a referential value and is based on the theory of language as representative or referring tool for which a sentence is meaningful or if it can be described in the terms of empirical experience. Meaninglessness itself is known as the language reveals it. Empiricists, in general and logical positivists, in particular, stand self-contradicted if they submit themselves to verification as the cause of the verity of cognition which for the present theory, is revealed by language.

According to the theory discussed herein, cognition is revealed by language independently of physiological, psychological and religious entities and our allegiance to them. As all knowledge is revealed by it (signifier), it is determinate and self veridical. This is the strongest of all those arguments given by Indian philosophical systems for proving the authority of the Veda. The Veda is authority not because of self verity only but because of being the cause of incentive to all sorts of do's and don'ts also. This verity serves as the cognitive ground of validity and invalidity, consistency or inconsistency, truth and falsity based on criteria of availability or absence of the corresponding things and the logical inquiry based on rules of identity, difference, contradiction, etc.

The cognition revealed by language is a veridical-cognition as communication is accomplished by it. If the veridical cognition revealed by language in the mind is denied as the cognitive base, any implication, inference will be unfounded. Metaphysical entities may be accepted as known by implication as ontic base of the cognition revealed by language but cognitively their ontic existence without the cognition cannot even be inferred or implicated. On the contrary, if the cognition revealed by language is taken as cognitive-base of inference, etc. of those entities, the problem of the link between the two (i.e. between the cognition revealed and the cognition of the object consequently inferred) and the demand of any further epistemic justification for convincing the philosophical need for accepting or denying it as true or false will be solved philosophically. Even if further justification is demanded for convincing and believing the veridical cognition, the cognition revealed by language stands as cognitive base of all those known consequently by inference, etc. and, perhaps, this is the reason that Bhartṛhari and his commentators have not felt any need for discussing epistemological problem separately.

As far as the differences of the cognitions by fantasy, allegories, myths, factual, non-factual and other expressions are concerned, they are relative to communication. They are different forms of knowledge having different sorts of objects on the basis of which their differences are known by the expression themselves. Though all sorts of objects are intelligible their differences are known by the form of the object figured in the mind by language. Those who are not well versed in communication, as in the cases of children, may take fantasy, myths, etc., as expressions of real-life situations but when they grow up; they see the differences of the objects of cognition. The cognition by the expression "A is a myth" is a veridical cognition and that is why it is known thus. Verity of cognition is based neither on referents nor on empirical evidences and epistemic justifications but on the accomplishment of communication itself.

### **Critique of Ontological Commitment of Language**

The issue of ontological commitment of language is based on confusing the language as confined to tools, objects of cognition as the external things to which the language refers to and the separateness of language and cognition. Actually, cognition is revealed by language in the mind independently of things ontic in nature. One can think that in practice we find such a commitment on the basis of which we understand world when we use language but such thinking is non-philosophical. If the use- phenomena are analyzed on the basis of cognition that is expressed by language without any ontic influence on which the cognition revealed is imposed, it is difficult to find the ontological commitment as a necessity involved in the cognition expressed by language. The activity of imposing the objects flashed on the ontic entities is deeply rooted in the very structure of ordinary people because of which they think of commitment of cognition by language with the external things. A wise or a philosopher concerns with the analysis of and reflects on the cognition as it is figured in by language. Only this way, the cognition stands as a virtue and the value of language and cognition can properly be estimated as interesting and philosophically universal in essence. If this position is denied, it will be difficult to differentiate philosophical activity as cognitive activity par excellence different from objective and subjective reflections on the objects as such with which other disciplines are concerned.

### **Conclusion**

To be precise, autonomy theory of language aims at analyzing different possible theories on the issue with a purpose to observe how far those theories are successful in interpreting the cognition as it figures in usual communication. Its task comprises investigation in to the question as to what part of the concept as accomplished in communication is left unmarked or unexplained by the popular theories on that concept. It gives importance to different theories as varied attempts in the way of interpreting the cognition accomplished by language in communication. Cognition is indivisible and observation of the different theories of interpretation of it helps in making the indivisible understandable in a piecemeal scheme. The language and the meaning are indivisible units of awareness and different theories of language, the word, the sentence, their meanings and relation are attempts at making the cognition understandable in an analytic scheme. The success of a theory lies in making the cognition, as it is accomplished by language in communication, understandable clearly through the analysis and explanation.

Language is autonomous because it is the force, the flash of awareness in nature. It performs several functions without being subordinated to any ontic entity; it reveals its own-self when manifested by the garbs and in some cases even without garbs; it reveals its meaning non-differently and independently of any exterior reality, physiological, psychological or religious entities; it serves as an incentive to manifest garbs in cases of expectancy to communicate and through those garbs it is communicated; it expresses the sense in the mind of audience when communicated and serves as the incentive to do, not to do or otherwise in them. It being the flash is revealed unit, its characterization as indivisible unit ubiquitously given as infused with thoughts, and communicability or sharability by nature form the essence of its autonomy. Communication cannot be explained possible if language as ubiquitous principle is not given. Senses are given to all living beings through which sensory activities are performed by them. Language is ubiquitous because of which cognition and communication and other cognitive activities take place in between the speakers and the audience and even so independently of any mediacy. Its authoritativeness lies in verity because what is expressed by language is veridical and serves as the cognitive ground of different logical formulations-syntactic and semantic rules and criteria of verifying or falsifying on the logic of availability or absence of corresponding empirical entities. It does not flash as guided by the rules of mind but it is understood as rules per se.

The objects of the flashes are the intelligible beings and can only be communicated. That which is not the object of knowledge cannot be communicated. The language is for communication and communication is not confined to speaking and hearing; it is the cognition expressed in the mind by language. It is not philosophical if a theory accepts something transcendental to cognition for explaining the truth or reality of cognition by the intrusion of a non-cognitive or supra cognitive transcendental thing. Cognition is sharable and hence communicable because it is infused by language. It is ubiquitously given to all as concepts and can be expressed through articulate utterances which are manifested as and when there is expectancy to speak. The incentive caused by the cognition revealed by the language in the mind causes expectancy. The content of the cognition, that is, the language and the meaning are the beings communicated through the articulate utterances, written marks, gestures which are garbs one learns in a communicating society and even in leaning garbs the language infusing thoughts serves as the cognitive base.

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